The Evolution of Greece\u27s Security Legislation and Policy by Andreas Borgeas
Journal of International and Comparative Law 
Volume 3 
Issue 2 Volume 3, Spring 2013, Issue 2 Article 2 
March 2016 
The Evolution of Greece's Security Legislation and Policy 
Andreas Borgeas 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jicl 
 Part of the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Andreas Borgeas (2013) "The Evolution of Greece's Security Legislation and Policy," Journal of 
International and Comparative Law: Vol. 3 : Iss. 2 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jicl/vol3/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of International and Comparative Law by an authorized editor of St. 
John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
 THE EVOLUTION OF GREECE’S SECURITY 
LEGISLATION AND POLICY   
 




Greece’s economic crisis forecasts a bleak future for those 
already referred to as the “lost generation.”  This generation came 
of age during the optimism of Greece’s European prosperity, yet 
now is regarded as a casualty of the Eurozone debt crisis which has 
shattered the country’s prospects and psyche. 1   Under such 
traumatic conditions it should come as no surprise that political 
violence in the streets has become a common occurrence.2  Nor 
should the leap from political violence to resurgent terrorist 
activity be unexpected under these circumstances, especially given 
                                                
* Andreas Borgeas is the Professor of International and Comparative Law at the 
San Joaquin College of Law.  Professor Borgeas conducted research for this 
article in part while a Fulbright Fellow in Greece, a Contributing Scholar for the 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and a Visiting Fellow at the 
Hellenic Centre for European Studies. He would like to extend deep 
appreciation to his beautiful family – Anna, Aleko and Aris Borgeas, the 
Kanarakis family, the Fulbright Foundation in Greece, and to Professor Kosta 
Ifantis of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. Without their 
support and encouragement this article would not have been possible.  
Appreciation is also extended to the editorial staff who independently 
contributed some of the sourcing support for this article.      
1 See Viola Caon, Europe's Lost Generation: How it Feels to be Young and 
Struggling in the EU, THE OBSERVER (Jan. 28, 2012, 3:00 PM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/ 2012/jan/28/europes-lost-generation-young-
eu (stating that Greek youth have been among the most affected by Greece’s 
economic crisis); see also Greece’s Youth in Crisis, THE DAILY BEAST (Nov. 22, 
2011, 4:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/ 2011/11/21/greece-s-
youth-in-crisis.html (emphasizing that the unemployment rate for Greece’s 
young adults has risen due to the economic crisis). 
2 See Dina Kyriakidou & George Georgiopoulos, Gun Attack on PM's Party HQ 
as Greek Violence Escalates, NBC NEWS (Jan. 14, 2013, 2:03 PM), http:/ /www. 
Msnbc.msn.com/id/50460037/ns/business-stocks_and_economy/t/gun-attack-
pms-party-hq-greek-violence-escalates/#.UP3VIB1BAvk (commenting that 
Greece is currently facing attacks on political figures due to the financial crisis); 
see also David Muir & Bradley Blackburn, How Did Greek Economic Crisis 
Get So Bad?, ABC NEWS (May 5, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/greeks-
streets-violent-protests-economic-problems/ story?id=10567233 (providing an 
example of violence resulting from protests due to the economic crisis in 
Greece). 
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the revolutionary strains so recognizable in Greece’s political 
culture.3 
Few European countries have internalized the political and 
cultural forces of terrorism as much as Greece.  On a popular level, 
Greece has experienced dramatic fluctuations in its security 
legislation and policy toward an assortment of indigenous and 
foreign resistance causes.4  Greece today, especially as it struggles 
with its financial turmoil, reveals the strains of its historically 
expressive populace.  That is why Greece’s history, and the 
manner in which its laws and policies have evolved, make Greece 
unique to the study of terrorism.  This article examines the political 
fluctuations that have influenced Greece’s security policies toward 
terrorism, both Middle Eastern based and indigenous, and the 
corresponding evolution of Greece’s legal instruments amidst the 
changing nature of Greece’s terrorist threats. 
 
I. Middle Eastern Terrorism and Greece  
 
Among European countries Greece has been unique in its 
security policies toward terrorism originating from the Middle 
East.  Greece is valuable for this study in large part because of the 
significant vacillations in its security policies and involvement in 
                                                
3 See Anthee Carassava, Bomb Blast at Greece Shopping Mall Raises Fears of 
Extremism, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2013, 7:44 PM), http://www.latimes.com/news/ 
nationworld/world/la-fg-greece-violence-20130121,0,6314563.story (reporting a 
shopping mall bombing in Greece and explaining its possible connection to the 
economic troubles); see also George Papadopoulos, Crisis in Greece: Anarchists 
in the Birthplace of Democracy, TERRORISM MONITOR, July 12, 2012, at 4, 
available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews% 
5Btt_news%5D=39613&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=588 (discussing the 
economic crisis in Greece and the reappearance of anarchists as a result). 
4 See Georgios Karyotis, Securitization of Greek Terrorism and Arrest of the 
‘Revolutionary Organization November 17’, COOPERATION AND CONFLICT, 
Sept. 2007, at 271, 276–84, available at http://www.academia.edu/2334458/ 
Securitization_of_Greek_Terrorism_and_Arrest_of_the_Revolutionary_Organiz
ation_November_17_ (citations omitted) (detailing how Greek’s treatment of 
terrorist activities has changed throughout the years); see also New Provisions of 
the “Anti”-Terror Law, CONTRA INFO (Nov. 27, 2010), 
http://en.contrainfo.espiv.net/2010/11/27/new-provisions-of-the-anti-terror-law/ 
(remarking that anti-terrorism laws in Greece changed in August 2010 which 
expanded the definition of terrorism). 
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Middle Eastern affairs.5  Greece’s relevance in the region has been 
enhanced by the absence of a colonial legacy, a restive minority 
population, and the complexities of a prominent role in world 
affairs.6  Greece was not an imperial power so it has no need to 
cope with the historical animosity of a subjugated people, nor is its 
politics so associated with western hegemony that its institutional 
or commercial entities are viewed as targets of real consequence.  
Even considering its historical differences with Turkey and a 
strong Orthodox Christian identity, theoretically Greece should be 
a relatively benign country in terms of terrorism.  However, Greece 
has been an active country for terrorist operations for several 
reasons.7 
First, Greece had stripped away many of its security 
capabilities following its military dictatorship around the time 
terrorism emerged on the scene.8  Second, Greece has strong 
popular and media support for Middle Eastern causes—in 
particular, the Palestinian, Kurdish, and Armenian causes—which 
                                                
5 See Dr. Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, Seeking Opportunities in Crisis Times: Greek 
Foreign Policy in the Middle East, ELIAMEP THESIS, Mar. 2012, available at 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id= 
142756.(noting the fluctuations in Greece’s policies toward the Middle East). 
See generally Spiros Ch. Kaminaris, Greece and Middle Eastern Terrorism, 3 
MIDDLE EAST REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, MERIA JOURNAL, June, 
1999, available at http://212.150.54.123/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=403 
(outlining reasons why Greece has become a target of terrorist organizations). 
6 See RICHARD CLOGG, A CONCISE HISTORY OF GREECE 236–37 (2nd ed. 1992) 
(noting that in the 1990s, Greece was mostly homogenous and had a small 
minority population); see also George Protopapas, Greece’s InternationalProfile 
and Crisis, IFIMES (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.ifimes.org/ en/print/?id= 
659 (positing that Greece’s involvement in international affairs has been 
destroyed in large part by the economic crisis). 
7 See Ayaz R. Shaikh, Note, A Theoretic Approach to Transnational Terrorism, 
80 GEO. L.J. 2131, 2171 (1992) (citations omitted) (referencing accusations 
made by the United States that Greece was giving sanctuary to Middle East 
terrorists); see also James Risen, A Pattern of Unsolved Greek Terrorism Cases, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/06/09/world/a-pattern-
of-unsolved-greek-terrorism-cases.html (stating that Greece was ranked second 
in the world for their amount of anti-American terrorist attacks). 
8 See JAN OSKAR ENGENE, TERRORISM IN WESTERN EUROPE: EXPLAINING THE 
TRENDS SINCE 1950 151 (2004) (stating that it was only after Greece’s shift to 
democracy that terrorism in the country became a challenge); see also Greek 
Domestic Terrorism, NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER: COUNTERTERRORISM 
2013 CALENDAR http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/greek.html (last visited Jan. 
22, 2013) (noting that terrorist groups appeared after the fall of Greece’s 
military dictatorship). 
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tends to excite existing anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiments.9  
Third, Greece’s proximity to the Middle East and geography are 
ideal.  Its porous borders and waterways are difficult to secure and 
Greece’s E.U. membership allows for relative ease of movement 
within Europe.10  The final reason is due to the presence of western 
targets, including diplomatic institutions, companies, and military 
installations.11  Within the framework of these factors, this section 
examines Greece’s policies toward terrorism originating from the 
Middle East by surveying how different administrations have 
responded to select terrorism problems.     
Through most of Greece’s military dictatorship, or junta 
(1967-74), there was little in the way of Middle Eastern based 
terrorism on Greek soil.12  Yet, as Israel’s military gains stunned 
an embarrassed Arab world, the era of terrorism began in Europe.  
Following the demise of the dictatorships and the advent of 
parliamentary democracy, Greece underwent a period of profound 
reforms which stripped Greece’s security, intelligence, and 
military agencies of the extensive powers they previously 
exercised with enhanced civil protection substitutes. 13   For 
                                                
9  See CAROL MIGDALOVITZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21833, GREECE: 
THREAT OF TERRORISM AND SECURITY AT THE OLYMPICS 3 (2004), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21833.pdf (referencing the presence of people 
from Muslim and Arab countries in Greece); see also Soeren Kern, Greece to 
Build First Official Mega-Mosque in Athens, GATESTONE INST. INT’L POL’Y 
COUNCIL (Sept. 12, 2011, 5:00 AM), http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/2413/ 
greece-mosque-athens (indicating the large number of Muslims that have 
migrated to Greece from the Middle East and other locations in recent years). 
10 See MIGDALOVITZ, supra note 9, at 4 (recognizing that Greece has many ports 
of entry); see also Heath Cabot, The Governance of Things: Documenting Limbo 
in the Greek Asylum Procedure, 35 POLAR: POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
REV. 11, 11 (2012) (stating that many people from the Middle East, Africa, and 
South Asia have received access to the E.U. through Greece). 
11 See Nelson D. Schwartz, U.S. Companies Brace for an Exit From the Euro by 
Greece, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/03/ 
business/economy/us-companies-prepare-in-case-greece-exits-euro.html? 
pagewanted=all (presenting the effect on American companies of Greece’s 
default on its debt).  
12 See CINDY C. COMBS & MARTIN W. SLANN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TERRORISM 
272 (2nd ed. 2007) (indicating that during the period of the military junta, 
terrorist groups such as the ELA appeared).  
13 See Richard Clogg, Greek Perspectives After the Elections, THE WORLD 
TODAY, Jan. 1975, at 7, 7 (discussing Greece’s “depoliticization” of the military 
in 1974); see also F. Stephen Larrabee, Dateline Athens: Greece for the Greeks, 
FOREIGN POL’Y, Winter 1981-82, at 158, 162 (acknowledging Greece’s civil 
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instance, the military’s internal security functions were eliminated 
and the police were prohibited from entering university grounds.14  
This was in reaction to the junta years when the military used 
violent means to suppress student demonstrations. 15   These 
symbolic reforms created security weaknesses that became more 
evident in 1976 when operatives from the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine hijacked an Air France plane as it departed 
from Athens.16  Greece was surprised by the fact that terrorists 
knew to exploit its relaxed security measures, and, in conjunction 
with the Turkish occupation of Cyprus, brought Middle Eastern 
issues to the forefront of Greek politics.17   
 
A. PASOK and New Democracy 
 
While Greece has a parliamentary form of government with 
many political parties, power still rests firmly in the main parties 
                                                                                                         
reforms and the purge of the military from government in the years following 
the dictatorship). 
14 See Niki Kitsantonis, Debate Rages in Greece About Right of Police to Enter 
University Campuses, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/12/10/world/europe/10iht-greece.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (describing 
the impetus behind Greece’s law banning police from university campuses); see 
also Kathy Tzilivakis, University Asylum Law Lifted, ATHENS NEWS (Jan. 31, 
2011, 4:04 AM), http://www.athensnews.gr/issue/13428/36835 ?action=print 
(explaining that Greece’s asylum law was originally passed under the PASOK 
government to prevent police from entering university premises, and since then 
has only been lifted a total of three times). 
15 See JOHN S. KOLIOPOULOS & THANOS M. VEREMIS, MODERN GREECE: A 
HISTORY SINCE 1821, at 148 (2009) (noting the military’s suppression of the 
Athens Polytechnic uprising in 1973); see also Kitsantonis, supra note 14 
(describing Greece’s law banning police from university campuses as a response 
to the military suppression of student protests in 1973, where at least twenty-
three people were killed). 
16 MARK ENSALACO, MIDDLE EASTERN TERRORISM: FROM BLACK SEPTEMBER 
TO SEPTEMBER 11, at 96 (2008) (arguing that the lack of security in Athens 
airport allowed terrorists to easily attain weapons and hijack Air France flight 
139); J. PAUL DE B. TAILLON, HIJACKING AND HOSTAGES: GOVERNMENT 
RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 64 (2002) (stating that Athens airport was historically 
known for having inadequate security). 
17 See DAVID A. HARRIS, IN THE TRENCHES: SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 
OF AN AMERICAN JEWISH ACTIVIST 134 (Vol. 3 2002–03, 2004) (arguing that 
Greece’s historical conflict with Turkey was a contributing factor in Greek 
policy toward the Arab world); see also Spiros Ch. Kaminaris, supra note 5. 
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PASOK and New Democracy. 18   The two can generally be 
described respectively as the socialist and conservative parties.19  
Andreas Papandreou founded and served as the charismatic 
leader of the PanHellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). 20  
Despite being arrested by dictators twice—once under Metaxas’ 
reign in 1939 and again during Papadopolous’ reign in 1967—
Papandreou is a legendary figure in Greek politics because his 
polarizing reign embodies Greece’s struggle with right-wing 
governance and perceived U.S. imperialism.21  After residing in the 
U.S. for twenty years following his first exile, Papandreou returned 
to Greece in 1959 and shortly thereafter was appointed economic 
advisor to his father George Papandreou when he became Prime 
Minister.22  When Greece’s military dictatorship came to power in 
                                                
18 George Georgiopoulos & Stephen Grey, Special Report: Greece’s Other Debt 
Problem, REUTERS (Sept. 27, 2012, 4:44 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article 
/2012/09/27/us-greece-politics-parties-idUSBRE88Q0EA20120927 (naming 
PASOK and New Democracy as the two main political parties in Greece). 
19  See New Democracy (ND), ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www. 
britannica.com/ EBchecked/topic/411357/New-Democracy-ND (last visited Jan. 
21, 2013) (describing New Democracy’s founding and conservative ideologies, 
namely, increased economic liberalization and support for European 
integration); see also Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/ EBchecked/topic/441273/Panhellenic-
Socialist-Movement-PASOK (last visited Jan. 21, 2013) (remarking on 
PASOK’s shift from radical roots, which advocated to quell all military alliances 
and increase regulation of the economy, to socially democratic ideals). 
20 See JOSE MAGONE, CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN POLITICS: A COMPARATIVE 
INTRODUCTION 376 (2010) (reporting that the founding of the political party 
occurred on September 3, 1973); see also Marlise Simons, Andreas Papandreou 
Dies at 77; Fiery, Ambiguous Premier Dominated Greek Politics, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 23, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/23/world/andreas-papandreou-
dies-at-77-fiery-ambiguous-premier-dominatedgreek-politics.html?pagewanted= 
all&src=pm (describing Papandreou’s leadership style as passionate and fiery). 
21 See MAGONE, supra note 20 (remarking on PASOK’s verbally radical stance 
and ability to capitalize on anti-American sentiments in Greece during that 
period); see also Andreas George Papandreou, Epic Greek Politician, Died On 
June 23rd, Aged 77, ECONOMIST (June 29, 1996), http://www.economist.com/ 
node/14581071 (labeling Papandreou as an “epic” politician and the “most 
successful Greek leader of the century”). 
22  See Theodore C. Kariotis, Andreas G. Papandreou: The Economist, 23 
JOURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA 33, 34 (1997), available at 
http://thesis.haverford.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10066/5719/Kariotis_23_1.p
df?sequence=1 (discussing Papandreou’s years as a professor at the University 
of Minnesota and subsequently, the University of California at Berkeley); see 
also Simons, supra note 20 (detailing Papandreou’s experiences in the United 
States, which included arriving in the United States with $14 in his pocket, 
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1967, both father and son were imprisoned and Andreas later fled 
Greece for the second time when George died under house arrest.23  
In exile, Andreas Papandreou established the new PanHellenic 
Liberation Movement, predecessor to PASOK, and in 1981 
PASOK prevailed against the conservative New Democracy, 
which led to Greece’s first socialist Prime Minister.24  Despite his 
deep ties to the U.S., Papandreou blamed U.S. intelligence for the 
junta’s abuses and set the tone for Greece’s anti-American 
sympathies as well as the groundwork for his foreign policies.25     
The central issue for Greece when PASOK came to power 
was the ongoing political crisis with Turkey.  Papandreou inspired 
political support by castigating the U.S. for its tacit approval of 
Turkey’s invasion and continuing occupation of Cyprus. 26  
Disenchanted with the cold war gamesmanship of the American 
and Soviet adversaries, Papandreou promoted a policy of 
nonalignment and envisioned leading a socialist alternative to the 
                                                                                                         
earning a degree in economics from Harvard University, and serving in the 
United States Navy).  
23 See A Brief Biography of George A. Papandreou, HELLENIC REPUBLIC THE 
PRIME MINISTER, http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/files/George%20A 
.%20Papandreou%20-%20PROFILE13-09-20100.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 
2013) (revealing that Andreas Papandreou fled to Sweden after his release by 
the military dictatorship and then moved to Canada); see also Encyclopedia: 
Papandreou, Andreas Georgiou, YAHOO EDUCATION, http://education.yahoo. 
com/reference/encyclopedia/entry/Papandreou (last visited Jan. 21, 2013) 
(reporting that Andreas Papandreou was imprisoned and exiled in 1967).  
24 See Andreas George Papandreou, Epic Greek Politician, Died on June 23rd, 
Aged 77, ECONOMIST (June 29, 1996), http://www.economist.com/node/1458 
1071 (discussing the PASOK’s party victory in the 1981 elections); see also 
Encyclopedia: Papandreou, Andreas Georgiou, YAHOO EDUCATION, supra note 
23 (noting Papandreou’s creation of the PASOK party while he was in exile). 
25  See Andreas Papandreou, The ‘Greek Problem’ Is Really an American 
Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 21, 1968 (outlining Papandreou’s views that 
American involvement in Greek affairs continued even after the civil war had 
ended); see also John C. Loulis, Papandreou’s Foreign Policy, 63 FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS 375, 375 (1984), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/20042189 
(suggesting Papandreou’s anti-American rhetoric influenced Greek policy and 
Greek relations). 
26 See Jeffrey Simpson, Papandreou: Bearing Gifts to the Greeks, THE GLOBE & 
MAIL, Sep. 15, 1981 (discussing Papandreou’s campaign rhetoric that fed Greek 
fears of conspiracies hatched by the United States and Turkey); see also R.W. 
Apple, Jr., Greece Under Papandreou: Leftist but in Western Camp, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 19, 1984 (describing American fears that Papandreou’s anti-
American rhetoric would lead the country out of the Western alliance into a 
policy of neutralism). 
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capitalist west and communist east.27  In what become known as 
“tritokosmikos,” or “third-worldism,” Papandreou promoted 
sympathy for various Middle Eastern causes, primarily for the 
plight of the Palestinians, and in his first year in office he granted 
official recognition to the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO).28  His aim was to win Middle Eastern support over Cyprus 
by bolstering the Palestinian, Kurdish, and Armenian causes to 
ultimately establish regional policies for the containment of 
Turkey.29 
As Middle Eastern players attempted to leverage European 
support against Israeli adventurism, Greece found itself in the 
delicate position of championing these various causes while still 
trying to keep Greece out of their theater of operations.30  In 1984, 
British and American agents arrested Abdullah Fuad Shara of the 
May 15 organization in his Athens apartment. 31   To the 
astonishment of the U.S., Greece subsequently released Shara and 
provided him with safe passage to Algeria, accusing the foreign 
                                                
27 See Papandreou’s Legacy, IRISH TIMES, Jan. 18, 1996 (recounting Greece’s 
traumatic history with Germany and the United States that influenced the 
country’s political realignment in the 1970s); see also Papandreou, the Political 
Purebred, Forced to Save Greece, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 2, 2010 
(noting Andreas Papandreou’s policies including pulling Greece into the non-
aligned movement). 
28 See Greece Grants Diplomatic Status to P.L.O. Office, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 
1981 (announcing the establishment of diplomatic status to the PLO liaison and 
information office in Athens); see also Athens and Jerusalem, JERUSALEM POST, 
Jul. 11, 2011 (explaining Andreas Papandreou’s relationship with PLO chief 
Yasser Arafat as part of his effort to promote tritokosmikos). 
29 See Hasan Yilmaz, Turkey and the Middle East: Threats and Opportunities 
(June 2001) (unpublished thesis, Naval Postgraduate School) (illustrating that 
most of Arab support in the 1980s fell to Greece rather than Turkey); see also 
Kaminaris, supra note 5 (analyzing Papandreou’s sympathy for radical Arab 
regimes, including pro-Palestinian, pro-Armenian and pro-Kurdish support). 
30 See Patrick R. Hugg, Cyprus in Europe: Seizing the Momentum of Nice, 34 
VANDERBILT J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1293, 1328–29 (2001) (detailing various 
strategies implemented by Foreign Minister George Papandreou to create greater 
accord among the nations in the area); see also DAVID ALLEN & ALFRED 
PIJPERS, EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI 
CONFLICT 115, 1984 (illustrating instances where Greece has parted with the 
general UN community in support of Israeli actions). 
31 See Review & Outlook: Greek Mythology, WALL ST. J., July 10, 1984, at A9 
(stating that American agents found Fuad Hussein Shara of the “May 15 Group” 
during a raid on an Athens apartment); see also Leslie H. Gelb, Greece Upsets 
U.S. in Terrorist Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1984, at A9 (explaining that Shara, 
a member of the “May 15 Group” was detained in Athens). 
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agents of violating Greece’s sovereignty during his capture.32  It 
later surfaced that Papandreou had likely reached a secret 
arrangement with certain organizations that agreed to abstain from 
terrorist activities on Greek soil in exchange for Greece’s political 
support.  The American Ambassador angrily accused the Greek 
government of colluding with “Arab terrorist organizations, aiming 
to avoid terrorist activities in Greece.” 33   Yet, Papandreou’s 
bargained-for security would ultimately prove unsustainable given 
the regions’ competing interests and disunity amongst the players.  
Just as Papandreou’s policies openly defied the U.S., a Lebanese 
group hijacked a Trans World Airlines (TWA) plane from Athens 
in 1985.34  It then became clear that Papandreou could not maintain 
trusting alliances with the Middle Eastern players and was 
incapable of uniting the third world countries in any meaningful 
direction. Ultimately, the political realities would force 
Papandreou to take a more flexible position with Turkey.  While 
relations between Greece and the U.S. remained combative on the 
diplomatic level, Papandreou never followed through on his 
campaign threats to withdraw Greece from NATO or the European 
Community, and he never expelled the American military from 
Greek soil.35  By the time PASOK was elected out of office in 
                                                
32 See Review & Outlook: Greek Mythology, supra note 31 (showing that the 
Greeks gave Shara safe passage, due in part to the U.S. and U.K.’s violation of 
Greek Sovereignty); see also Gelb, supra note 31 (depicting the release of Shara 
and subsequent disdain toward American invasion of Greek sovereignty).  
33 See Bossis, infra note 68 at p. 136 (citing an article in the Greek newspaper 
Eleftherotypia dated June 28, 1987 in which the American Ambassador sent a 
memo to the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs accusing the Greek government 
of having “…relations with Arab terrorist organization Abu Nidal aiming to 
avoid terrorist activities in Greece.”).  
34  See Edward Schumacher, Hostages in Lebanon: Sour Note For Athens; 
Philharmonic Cancels Stop in Greece on Basis of Warning About Airport, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 23, 1985, at A14 (stating that a Lebanese terrorists hijacked a 
T.W.A. flight from Athens); see also Paul Anastasi, Hostages in Lebanon; 
Greece Comes Under Criticism For Inadequate Airport Security, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 18, 1985, at A9 (explaining the hijacking of a Trans World Airlines plane 
as it left Athens and Greece’s inability to secure it’s airports). 
35 See U.S.-Greek Strains Turn Small Issues Into Big Ones, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 
1985, at A6 (expressing the strained diplomatic relations between the United 
States and Greece in the 1980’s); see also Philip Revzin, Greek Leader, Facing 
Economic Worries, Modifies His Vitriolic Anti-U.S. Rhetoric, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
14, 1986, at 35 (portraying the tepid diplomatic relations between the Greek and 
United States governments). 
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1989 Papandreou’s third-world policies had failed in their aim to 
exempt Greece from terrorist operations.36  
New Democracy, the conservative counterpart to PASOK, 
came to power in 1990 with Constantine Mitsotakis, nephew of 
famed Eleftherios Venizelos, 37  who abandoned Papandreou’s 
foreign agenda for a pro-American policy that included 
recognizing Israel and adopting tougher antiterrorism policies 
toward the Middle East. 38   Greece, for instance, supported 
Operation Desert Storm in Iraq and began arresting and deporting 
numerous suspected Palestinian operatives.39  Following a failed 
attempt by the Islamic Holy War Movement to assassinate the 
British Consul in 1991, Greece retaliated against the network and 
                                                
36 See Abu Nidal Members Jailed in France Over 1988 Attack, BBC (Mar. 1, 
2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17226400 (discussing a 
Palestinian terrorist group’s 1988 attack on a Greek cruise liner); see also U.S. 
Embassy Holds Ceremony for ‘November 17’ Victim Capt. Nordeen, GREEK 
EMBASSY, Jun. 28, 2001, www.greekembassy.org/embassy/Content/en/Article. 
aspx?office=2&folder=322&article=8318 (noting that U.S. diplomat William 
Nordeen was killed in a 1988 terrorist attack in Kefalari, Greece). 
37 See Greek Party Does Flip-Flop On Coalition, CHI. TRIB., June 20, 1989, at 
4C (declaring that after he was elected, Mitsotakis aimed to hold previous Prime 
Minister Andreas Papandreou accountable for his corrupt policies); see also 
Greece, Politics, Government, and Taxation, NATIONS ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Europe/Greece-POLITICS-
GOVERNMENT-AND-TAXATION.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2013) 
(observing that while New Democracy did win the 1990 election, the party 
quickly fell apart when members broke off to form a different party, known as 
Political Spring). 
38 See Greece Announces Full Recognition of Israel, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 
21, 1990, available at http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1990/Greece-Announces-
Full-Recognition-of-Israel/id-f4eb5671aadf6f25c4e5c9c95a7909a3 (stating that 
Greece was the last country in the European Community to establish diplomatic 
ties with Israel); see also Arnold Sherman, Greece’s Gamble, JERUSALEM POST, 
Aug. 17, 1990 (noting that Mitsotakis undertook these pro-American policies in 
an effort to receive economic aid).  
39 See Patrick Quinn, Greece to Deport Foreigners Connected to Terrorism, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 29, 1991, available at http://www.apnewsarchive.com/ 
1991/Greece-To-Deport-Foreigners-Connected-To-Terrorism/id d0423ba89914 
a3dc2b6ba0cc2413b91f (illustrating the vast deportations of foreigners that took 
place in Greece because of terrorism); see also George Tzogopoulos, Greece 
and Gulf War II, HELLENIC OBSERVATORY, at 7 (May 2005), available at 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute /research/ HellenicObservatory/pdf/2nd 
_Symposium/George_Tzogopoulos_paper.pdf (commenting that Prime Minister 
Mitsotakis believed he had to intervene in the Gulf War because Iraq had broken 
international law by invading Kuwait).  
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expelled the PLO representatives from Athens.40  This incident 
marked the first time Greece rejected a resistance network on its 
own soil and came to symbolize Greece’s departure from 
Papandreou’s policy of negotiated security.     
Yet again, Papandreou confounded his critics three years 
later when he won the premiership by igniting nationalist furor 
over the Macedonia (FYROM) crisis. 41   In this instance, 
Papandreou, with tenuous control in Parliament and with the 
heightened responsibilities of the E.U. presidency, promoted 
engagement with Turkey over the occupation of Cyprus and 
declined to veto Turkey’s nascent E.U. aspirations. 42   While 
reformist in some areas, Papandreou’s policies toward terrorism 
remained reactionary.  For instance, when Greece, acting on U.S. 
intelligence, finally arrested and convicted the wanted Palestinian 
Rashid Muhammad for bombing two American airliners, his 
sentence was subsequently reduced and he was later deported to 
Tunisia.43  Reports surfaced that Greece released Muhammad early 
                                                
40 See Jean Cohen, Greek Court Gives Palestinians Stiff Sentences for 1991 
Bombing, JEWISH TELEGRAPH AGENCY, July 19, 1992, available at 
archive.jta.org/article/1992/07/20/2877260/greek-court-gives-palestinians-stiff-
sentences-for-1991-bombing(stating that despite the PLO’s contentions that they 
were not involved with the attack, Greek authorities still deported members of 
the organization); see also Greece Expels 26 Palestinians in Botched Attack 
That Killed 7,  N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1991, www.nytimes.com/1991/06/13/ 
world/Greece-expels-26-palestinians-in-botched-attack-that-killed-7.html 
(discussing details of the attack that led to the expulsion of PLO members).  
41 See Marlise Simons, Andreas Papandreou, Greek Leftist Who Admired and 
Annoyed U.S., Dies at 77, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com 
/1996/06/24/world/andreas-papandreou-greek-leftist-who-admired-and annoyed-  
us-diesat-77.html?page wanted=all&src=pm (discussing how Papandreou’s 
failing health left him ineffective as a leader towards the end of his term); see 
also David B. Ottaway, Political Comeback in Greece; Papandreou Is Set to 
Win Vote – But How Socialist Is He Now?, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1993, at A24 
(opining that Mitsotakis’ policies of privatization and economic austerity made 
him unpopular, and played a part in Papandreou’s reelection). 
42 See Muzaffer Vatansever, The Possible Impacts of the Greek Election in 
Turkey, INT’L STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORG., Jan. 22, 2013, http://www.usak.org. 
tr/EN/myazdir.asp?id=1074 (noting that Papandreou vetoed negotiations for 
Turkey to become a member of the EU); see also Papandreou: Ankara Needs to 
Respect EU Rules, TODAY’S ZAMAN, Sept. 23, 2009, http://www.todayszaman. 
com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action;jsessionid=9BC499F557CD901A904D38
7997491BF4?load=detay&link=187716&newsId=187554 (citing Papandreou as 
stating that he would not rule out vetoing Turkey’s attempt to join the EU). 
43 See Cohen, supra note 40 (noting that the Greek High Court initially reduced 
Rashid’s sentence from eighteen to fifteen years due to good behavior); see also 
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and denied U.S. requests for extradition amid warnings by 
Palestinian groups that Greeks would be targeted if he were given 
to the U.S.44   
When poor health prompted Papandreou’s retirement in 
1996, he was replaced by Kostas Simitis, a PASOK technocrat 
oriented toward Greece’s accession to the Eurozone and 
reformation of Greece’s foreign policies.45  Greece was not going 
to support Papandreou’s national liberation struggles any longer.  
Yet, competing elements within the PASOK administration 
insisted on providing covert support to these causes, despite public 
proclamations to the contrary. 46   Even as Greece chafed at 
Turkey’s accusations of colluding with rebellious Kurds, Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK) guerilla leader Abdullah Ocalan was found 
                                                                                                         
Yoram Schweitzer, The Arrest of Mohammed Rashid – Another Point for the 
Americans, INT’L INST. FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM, June 7, 1998, http://212.150 
.54.123/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=35 (discussing that Rashid’s fifteen year 
sentence was cut short after only eight years when Greek authorities released 
him for “good behavior”). 
44 EDWARD F. MICKOLUS, TERRORISM, 1992-1995: A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
AND THE SELECTIVELY ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 22 (1997) (noting that in 
1993, a Greek appeals court diminished Rashid’s sentence to 15 years); see also 
E.A. Wayne, US Pushes Greece to Take Action Against Terrorism, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, July 22, 1988, http://www.csmonitor.com/1988/0722/aterr.html 
(discussing that in the past, Greece has released alleged terrorists from custody 
due to pressure from the Palestinian Liberation Organization). 
45 See Andy Dabilis, Simitis Slams Papandreou Over Crisis, GREEK REPORTER, 
Nov. 11, 2012, http://greece.greekreporter.com/2012/11/11/simitis-slams-
papandreou-over-crisis/ (discussing Costas Simitis’ criticisms of former prime 
minister Papandreou and the manner in which he led Greece towards the 
Eurozone); see also PASOK’s Time Is Over, Another Formation Will Take Its 
Place, Predicts Costas Simitis, GR REPORTER, (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.grrep 
orter.info/en/pasok%E2%80%99s_time_over_another_formation_will_take_its_
place_predicts_costas_simitis/5951 (noting that Simitis’ policy resulting in the 
accession of Greece into the Eurozone). 
46 See Dina Kyriakidou, Former Greek PM Attacks Successor As Socialist Rifts 
Deepen, THE STAR ONLINE (Nov. 10, 2012),  http://thestar.com.my/news/story 
.asp?file=/2012/11/10/worldupdates/2012-1110T133525Z_1_ BRE8A90A6_RT 
ROPTT_0_UK-GREECE-BOOK&sec=Worldupdates (noting that Greek prime 
minister Costas Simitis attacked his predecessor for mishandling the debt crisis, 
among other national struggles); see also Kerin Hope, Papandreou Criticizes 
U.S. Counter-Terrorism Policy, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 30, 1986) 
http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1986/Papandreou-Criticizes-U-S-Counter-
Terrorism-Policy/id-99d2b75eddf080e6699 9459ac06658f5 (citing Greek prime 
minister Papandreou as supporting national liberation struggles, particularly in 
Palestine, where he distinguished these scenarios from acts of terrorism). 
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in 1999 at the residence of the Greek Ambassador to Kenya.47  
This caused deep embarrassment to the Simitis administration as it 
was trying to improve its international image in preparation for the 
2004 Olympic Games.48   
Antiterrorism concerns stirred immense controversy during 
the time leading up to the Olympics.  The world media complained 
that Greece’s chronic delays and mismanagement were a prelude 
to security lapses in what would become known as a security 
failure of epic proportions.49  After all, Greece had a history of 
being soft on terrorism; notably, Greece’s failure to dismantle the 
indigenous November 17 organization based on its own soil.50  Not 
surprisingly, the U.S., Britain, and Israel, among others, insisted on 
exercising significant security oversight which set the tone as a 
                                                
47 See Greece: The Ocalan Crisis, ECONOMIST (Feb. 18, 1999), http://www. 
economist.com/node/186922 (discussing the resignation of the Greek foreign 
minister Theodoros Pangalos amid the scandal of Abdullah Ocalan’s capture); 
see also Turkey Snatches Kurdish Leader, BBC NEWS (Feb. 16, 1999), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/280622.stm (noting that Theodore Pangalos 
vehemently denied Greece’s involvement in the Abdullah Ocalan scandal). 
48  See Alessandra Stanley, 3 Greek Officials Removed Over Rebel Kurd’s 
Capture, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/19/ 
world/3-greek-officials-removed-over-rebel-kurdscapture.html?n=Top%2 
fReference%2fTimes%20Topics%2 fPeople %2fS%2fSimitis%2c%20Costas 
 (demonstrating how Greece’s involvement in harboring Ocalan had a negative 
impact on public opinion); see also Ilene R. Prusher, How Kurd’s Arrest Rattles 
Greece, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 26, 1999, http://m.csmonitor.com 
/1999/0226/p6s1.html (discussing how the Ocalan scandal derailed Greece’s 
attempt to reposition itself as a well-managed European democracy). 
49 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-547, OLYMPIC SECURITY: 
U.S. SUPPORT TO ATHENS GAMES PROVIDES LESSONS FOR FUTURE OLYMPICS 1 
(2005) (explaining that the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens were held during 
a period of heightened anxiety about terrorism); see also Raymond Bonner & 
Anthee Carassava, Delays in Athens Raise Concern on Olympic Security, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 3, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/03/world/delays-in-
athens-raise-concern-on-olympic-security-readiness.html?pagewanted=all&src 
=pm (claiming that Greece’s continuous construction delays contributed to a 
lack of confidence in the security of the 2004 Olympics). 
50 See Frank Bruni & Anthee Carassava, Greece to Begin Trial Involving Long-
Elusive Terror Group, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003 
/03/03/world/greece-to-begin-trial-involving-long-elusive-terror-group.html 
?ref=november17. (asserting that Greece’s hosting of the 2004 Olympics served 
as an impetus to dismantle the November 17 guerilla group); see also Tekla 
Szymanski, Greece: November’s Fall?, 49 WORLD PRESS REV. 9 (2002), 
available at http://worldpress.org/Europe/671.cfm (arguing that Greece’s 
reluctance to take down the November 17 terror group is indicative of the 
country’s tolerance of terrorism). 
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loss of confidence in Greece’s ability to host the games safely.51  
Despite having set the security policies in place for what ultimately 
became a successful Olympics, Simitis did not stand for reelection 
in 2004 and New Democracy returned to power with Kosta 
Karamanlis as Prime Minister.52  Greece’s antiterrorism efforts in 
the successive administrations went through dramatic changes, 
both in terms of policy and execution.  Some changes were 
organic, but most were precipitated by intervening forces and the 
expanding security regulations of the E.U.  Accordingly, the study 
of Greece’s antiterrorism policies must consider these intervening 
changes.  However, the New Democracy and PASOK policies 
discussed above remain an insightful means toward understanding 
the political sensibilities of Greek leadership.   
As convenient as it would seem to understand PASOK and 
New Democracy by their political labels, merely doing so would 
be an injustice to the study of terrorism.  PASOK’s policies under 
Papandreou ultimately proved unsuccessful because the exchange 
of political support for safety guarantees as a matter of policy was 
unsustainable given the complexity of the region, its competing 
interests, and the disunity amongst the players.  While New 
Democracy opposed compromise with organizations that used 
violence as a political tool, especially where civilians were 
targeted, the latter of the two approaches remains the most 
prevalent policy in western practice.53  In this way terrorists are at 
least aware in advance of the limits of political leverage through 
                                                
51 See MIGDALOVITZ, supra note 9, at 5–6 (stating that the Greek government 
established a seven-nation Olympic Advisory Group to assist with security for 
the Olympics); see also Diana Muriel, Athens in Race Against Time, CNN, May 
6, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/Europe/03/25/olympic.constructio 
n/index.html, (indicating that the Olympic Advisory Committee contributed 
more than $800 million to the security budget for the 2004 Olympics). 
52 See ANN NEIR ET AL., Europe, 39 INT’L LAW. 569, 587–88 (2005) (explaining 
that after almost twenty years in power the socialist party lost the national 
elections to the party of New Democracy); see also Helena Smith, Greek Right 
Ends Era of Socialist Power, GUARDIAN, Mar. 8, 2004, http://www.guardian.co. 
uk/world/2004/mar/08/helenasmith. (discussing the shift from Socialist control 
to democracy with the election of Karamanlis). 
53  See BBC INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, BBS MONITORING, GREEK PRIME 
MINISTER CALLS FOR NATIONAL UNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE 1 (2008) 
(summarizing Karamanlis’ opposition to violence as a means to reach political 
objectives); see also WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, GREEK PRIME MINISTER SAYS 
GREECE CONDEMNS ALL ACTS OF VIOLENCE, TERRORISM 1 (2005) (stating that 
Karamanlis unequivocally condemned acts of violence and terrorism). 
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use of violence, although many examples exist where terrorism 
became politically persuasive.  The policies of these parties reflect 
more than the time and the players involved.  They bear on the 
political sensibilities of the Greek populace as well as the choices 
every country confronts in establishing antiterrorism policies; 
particularly, the extent to which dialogue and negotiation may 
inspire terrorists to transform into political entities, as usually 
occurs in the evolution of many organizations with lasting and 
realistic objectives.  Papandreou’s policy reveals the major 
variables in dealing with terrorist organizations, including the 
nature, purpose, and cohesion of the group itself.  Further, 
promoting resistance struggles only to weaken a third-party 
adversary is not valuable when the subject group’s proxies cannot 
be controlled.  In fact, the very country seeking to emerge as the 
intended alternative authority may be exposed to blackmail, as it 
occurred with Greece.   
 
II. Domestic Terrorism in Greece and November 17 
 
Domestic terrorism first emerged in Greece in response to 
the repressive policies of the military dictatorships known as the 
“Regime of the Colonels,” or junta, which collectively refers to a 
series of right-wing governments between 1967 and 1974.54  The 
colonels justified their takeover by claiming that communist 
sympathizers had infiltrated and subverted Greece.55  Meanwhile, 
under the policies initiated by the 1947 Truman Doctrine, the U.S. 
did not object and perhaps even helped instigate the coup d’état 
since the takeover promised an even more secure means of 
                                                
54  See ALBERT PARRY, TERRORISM: FROM ROBESPIERRE TO THE WEATHER 
UNDERGROUND 413 (2006) (asserting that Greek domestic terrorism was a 
response to the junta’s repressive policies); see also GEORGE KASSIMERIS, 
EUROPE’S LAST RED TERRORISTS: THE REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION 17 
NOVEMBER 25–26 (2001) (arguing that disillusionment in the wake of post-
Colonels Greece manifested itself in the form of terrorism). 
55 See Harry J. Psomiades, Greece: From the Colonels’ Rule to Democracy in 2 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER 
REGIMES: COUNTRY STUDIES 253 n.1 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995) (chronicling that 
the Colonels justified their seizure of power as necessary to prevent a 
Communist takeover); see also SUSANNE VOIGT, MILITARY REGIMES IN TURKEY 
AND GREECE A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 1 (2008) (explaining that the junta 
wanted to prevent a Communist takeover of Greece). 
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containing Soviet expansion during the Cold War.56  With U.S. 
support, the junta aggressively sought to purge Greece of its leftist 
elements—dissolving political parties, suppressing civil liberties, 
rendering stiff punishments by military courts—and as a result 
thousands of suspected political opponents were imprisoned, 
exiled, and assassinated.57  These experiences left an indelible 
mark on the Greek psyche and inspired in some a call to arms.     
 
A. N17 the Organization 
 
While Greece has been known for having over 250 
domestic terrorist groups,58 November 17 (N17)59 remained the 
most notorious and lethal of Greece’s indigenous terrorist 
organizations.  It is widely accepted that the organization adopted 
its name after the infamous day in 1973 where students at the 
National Technical University of Athens demonstrated against the 
fascist policies of the junta.60  The brutal repression of these 
                                                
56 See SIMÓN DUKE, UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN 
EUROPE 163 (1989) (showing that the coup was in the interest of the United 
States against the Soviet Union); see also DAVID F. SCHMITZ, THE UNITED 
STATES AND RIGHT-WING DICTATORSHIPS 70 (2006) (showing that a former 
U.S. Secretary of State supported the Greek colonels pursuant to the Truman 
Doctrine’s containment policy). 
57 See DONALD F. BUSKY, DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM: A GLOBAL SURVEY 69 
(2000) (documenting that the junta ordered the arrest of leftists, censored the 
news media, and suspended political parties and civil rights); see also 
BACKGROUND TO CONTEMPORARY GREECE 264 (Marion Saraphe & Marion n 
Saraphē eds., 1990) (documenting that the junta indefinitely extended 
emergency powers). 
58 See Ta Nea, Nov. 10, 1999 (Greek Ministry of Public Order release); see also 
Georgios Kayotis, Securitization of Greek Terrorism and Arrest of the 
‘Revolutionary y Organization November 17’, 43 COOPERATION AND CONFLICT: 
JOURNAL OF THE NORDIC INTERNATIONAL STUDIES ASSOCIATION 271 (2007) 
(documenting that around 250 terrorist groups have claimed responsibility for 
attacks in Greece since the 1970s). 
59 See Επαναστατική Οργάνωση 17 Νοέµβρη, Epanastatiki Organosi dekaefta; 
see also Kayotis, supra note 59 (asserting that N17 was the most influential, 
lethal, and radical group of the Greek terrorist organizations). 
60  See George Kassimeris, For a Place in History: Explaining Greece’s 
Revolutionary Organization 17 November, 27 U. NEW BRUNSWICK J. CONFLICT 
STUD. 129, 130 (2007) (explaining that the name November 17, or 17N, comes 
from the day in 1973 when the Greek military junta used tanks to crush a 
student-worker protest at Athens Polytechnic University); see also November 
17, Revolutionary People’s Struggle, Revolutionary Struggle, (Greece, leftists), 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/Greece/november-17-
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demonstrations later embodied the popular struggle for Greece to 
reclaim itself from the dark legacy of the dictatorships and the 
foreign powers popularly perceived to be exploiting Greece.61 
Although N17 became operational in 1975, remarkably 
little was known about the organization and its membership until 
2002.62  For over twenty-six years N17 eluded Greece’s security 
and intelligence services, enhancing its mystery and fueling 
speculation of collusion within the ranks of the socialist PASOK 
government and law enforcement.63  Following an N17 attack, the 
primary source of information about the attack came from N17 
itself in carefully released public proclamations rather than from 
Greek investigators announcing arrests.  In these proclamations, 
N17 sparsely fashioned itself as Marxist along ultra socialist lines 
with heavy doses of Greek nationalism.64  While N17 lacked a 
                                                                                                         
revolutionary-peoples-struggle-revolutionary-struggle-greece-leftists/p9275 (last 
visited Jan. 19, 2013) (confirming that November 17 derives its name from the 
student uprising at Athens Polytechnic University on November 17, 1973). 
61 See Steven Erlanger, Greece Hopes Arrests Earn It Europe’s Embrace, N.Y. 
TIMES Aug. 5, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/05/world/greece-hopes-
arrests-earn-it-europe-s-embrace.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (reiterating that 
the terrorist group November 17 developed from popular struggle against the 
1967-74 Greek dictatorship); see also Revolutionary Group 17 November (RO-
N17), NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM & RESPONSES TO 
TERRORISM, http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist 
_organization_profile.asp?id=101(last visited Jan. 19, 2013) (affirming that 
November 17 is a nationalist terrorist group that targets groups it believes are 
responsible for Greece’s exploitation). 
62 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2007 – GREECE 
72 (2008), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48196cafc.html 
(reporting that most of the N17 terrorists were apprehended in 2002); see also 
Robin Oakley, N17: Decades of Deadly Terror, CNN.COM, (July 31, 2002, 1:09 
PM), http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/07/31/n17.background. 
oakley/index.html (announcing, that as of July 2002, police had arrested 14 
members of N17 and believed to have crippled the N17 organization). 
63 See Jonathan Rendell, Yard Closes Net on Greek Terrorists, TELEGRAPH, July 
7, 2002, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/greece/1400645/ 
Yard-closes-net-on-Greek-terrorists.html (proclaiming that N17 has eluded 
agencies like Interpol and the FBI for thirty years); see also Greek Arrest over 
CIA Chief Murder, CNN.COM, (July 25, 2002, 8:23 AM), http://articles.cnn.com 
/2002-07-25/world/greece.n17_1_greek-police-alexandros-giotopoulos-pavlos-
serifis?_s=PM:WORLD (declaring that N17 gained notoriety with its ability to 
elude the police for twenty-seven years). 
64 See Anther Carassava, Film Revisits Greece’s Recent Terrorist Past, But is the 
Nation Ready?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/ 
oct/23/world/la-fg-greece-terror-20101024 (defining 17N as a militant Marxist 
revolutionary movement); see also Police Find N17 Murder Weapon, 
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clearly discernible ideology, at times bordering on anarchy, it 
directed its revolutionary ire against former junta officials, the U.S. 
and its perceived agents, businessmen, and New Democracy 
politicians.65  N17 also bitterly opposed the free global market and 
NATO, and eventually opposed Europe’s deepening integration.66 
Early on N17 drew much support from students, laborers, exiles 
and intellectuals eager for retribution for the tragedies that befell 
Greece under the junta.67  Even after the dictatorship, former junta 
elements remained within the ranks of the police and military 
despite popular demands for justice. Many of the perpetrators 
avoided accountability by the stigmiaio legislation, which legally 
mitigated their participation in the dictatorships as a temporary 
offense. 68   Greece sought to avoid the kind of potentially 
                                                                                                         
CNN.COM, (July 17, 2002, 8: 54 AM), http://articles.cnn.com/2002-07-
17/world/n17.arrests_1_greek-police-greece-shootings?_s=PM:WORLD 
(affirming that N17 portrayed itself primarily as a Marxist group and later as a 
nationalist group). 
65 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGS. 96 (2004), available 
at http://www.scribd.com/doc/9707247/Foreign TerroristOrganizations# 
download (referring to N17 as an anti-Western, leftist terrorist organization that 
opposes the Greek establishment, the U.S., the EU, and the Turkish involvement 
in Cyprus); see also Revolutionary Group 17 November (RO-N17), NAT’L 
CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM & RESPONSES TO TERRORISM, 
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profi
le.asp?id=101(last visited Jan. 19, 2013) (affirming that N17 principles are anti-
American, anti-Turkey, anti-NATO, anti-EU, anti-Greek establishment, anti-
colonial and anti-capitalist). 
66 See Tekla Szymanski, Greece: November’s Fall?, WORLD PRESS REVIEW, 
Sept. 2002, Vol. 49 (discussing the history and emergence of the Greek terrorist 
group “N17,” and its sentiments against America, NATO and imperialism); see 
also November 17, Revolutionary People's Struggle, Revolutionary Struggle 
(Greece, Leftists), COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.cfr. 
org/greece/november-17-revolutionary-peoples-struggle-revolutionary-struggle-
greece-leftists/p9275# (noting N17’s opposition to Greece’s participation in 
NATO and the European Union). 
67 See George Kassimeris, Fighting for Revolution? The Life and Death of 
Greece’s Revolutionary Organization 17 November, 1975–2002, J.S. EUR. & 
BALKANS, 259, 261 (2004) (stating that the purposes of November 17’s first 
attacks were to align themselves with the concerns of the Greek public and gain 
sympathy); see also Bruce Wallace, Greece Makes Arrests in 27-Year Terrorism 
Saga, THE GAZETTE, July 19, 2002, at A13 (describing how N17 filled their 
ranks with lawyers, students and journalists). 
68  See Mary Bossis, The Mysteries of Terrorism and Political Violence in 
Greece, in CONFRONTING TERRORISM: EUROPEAN EXPERIENCES, THREAT 
PERCEPTIONS AND POLICIES 132 (Marianne Van Leeuwen ed., 2003) (discussing 
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destabilizing and protracted investigations that occurred after the 
Greek Civil War, from 1946 to 1949, where even an accusation of 
communist sympathies instigated sanctioned reprisals.69  As it was, 
the authorities appeared unwilling or incapable of enacting the 
retribution deeply expected by many Greeks.  Impressions 
naturally arose that N17 was fighting a proxy war on behalf of 
PASOK and other leftist elements in the Greek government. 70  
N17’s first assassinations occurred in 1975 and 1976 with 
the killing of CIA station chief Richard Welch and former police 
captain of the junta, Evangelos Mallios.  Following these 
assassinations, N17 submitted proclamations to the French and 
Greek newspapers Liberation and Eleftherotypia, claiming 
responsibility and political justifications for the killings.71  The 
nature of these calculated attacks made N17 infamous on an 
international scale, and N17’s apparent vigilantism resonated with 
certain disenchanted segments of the populace.72  These attacks 
were just a portent of the terrorist operations to come over the next 
                                                                                                         
the Greek government after dictatorship, and the role of former junta members 
in the current government). 
69  See Minas Samatas, Greek McCarthyism: A Comparative Assessment of 
Greek Post-Civil War Repressive Anticommunism and the U.S. Truman-
McCarthy Era, J. HELLENIC DIASPORA 5, 5 (1986) (describing the anti-
communist trend in both the United States and Greece in the last century); see 
also Ioannis A. Tassopoulos, New Trends in Greek Contemporary 
Constitutional Theory: A Comment on the Interplay Between Reason and Will, 
10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 223, 228 (1999) (discussing the anti-communist 
state that emerged in Greece following the conclusion of the Greek Civil War). 
70 See Press Release, Embassy of Greece, U.S. Envoy Says No Evidence 
Linking  PASOK To ‘N17’ (July 24, 2002), available at http://www.greek 
embassy.org (noting the investigations into PASOK about its possible ties with 
the N17 terrorist organization); see also Coral A. Davenport, How ‘November 
17’ Was Foiled, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 22, 2013, 2:04 PM), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0722/p06s01-wogi.html (explaining how 
PASOK has been rumored to protect N17 from detection and apprehension). 
71 See Kassimeris, supra note 54, at 74 (discussing the attacks on both Richard 
Welch and Evangelos Mallios in N17’s earliest stages as a terrorist 
organization); see also ALEX P. SCHMIDT ET AL., POLITICAL TERRORISM: A NEW 
GUIDE TO ACTORS, AUTHORS, CONCEPTS, DATABASES, THEORIES, AND 
LITERATURE 561 (2005) (noting the manifests left by N17 after attacks like the 
one on Richard Welch). 
72 See Kassimeris, supra note 54, at 74-75 (showing that N17 gained notoriety 
when it took credit for terrorist activity); see also WAYNE C. THOMPSON, THE 
WORLD TODAY SERIES 2012: WESTERN EUROPE 287 (2012) (arguing that the 
Greek government tolerated N17 because their socialist ideals and anti-
American rhetoric resonated with the Greek public). 
                              ST. JOHN’S JOURNAL OF                  [Vol. 3, No. 2 
                    INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 
 
180 
twenty-six years.  By the time it was dismantled in 2002, N17 was 
responsible for over 200 acts of violence and twenty-three 
assassinations—five American, one British, two Turkish, and 
many Greek businessman and prominent politicians of the 
conservative New Democracy Party.73    
 
B. The Investigation of N17  
  
After it was discovered that Greek diplomats harbored PKK 
leader Ocalan, Prime Minister Simitis reshuffled his cabinet and 
appointed Michalis Chrysochoidis as Minister of Public Order.74  
Despite his lack of national security and law enforcement 
credentials, Chrisohoidis was chosen to oversee the ministry in 
charge of Greece’s security with one main objective: to dismantle 
November 17 before the Olympics.75   
Chrysochoidis assembled a team for this specific 
assignment that included special prosecutor Yianni Diotis76 (both 
of whom were interviewed by the author for the writing of this 
                                                
73 See Mark Landler, Greece Convicts ‘November 17’ Terrorists; Radical Leftist 
Group Operated 27 Years, Killed 23 Victims, THE GLOBE & MAIL, Dec. 9, 2003, 
at A20 (illustrating that N17’s terror campaign lasted almost three decades and 
claimed  23 victims, including three U.S. officials); see also November 17, 
Revolutionary People’s Struggle, Revolutionary Struggle (Greece, leftists), 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 12, 2012) http://www.cfr.org/greece/November 
-17-revolutionary-peoples-struggle-revolutionary-struggle-greece-leftists/p9275 
(demonstrating that N17 attacked foreign diplomats, Greek officials, and 
eventually the general public). 
74  See Michalis Chrisochoidis: Minister of Regional Development and 
Competitiveness,ECONOMIST, http://cemea.economistconferences.com/content/ 
michalis-chrisohoidis (last visited Jan. 20, 2013) (indicating that Chrysochoidis 
served as Minister of the Public Order from 1999 to 2003); see also Race 
Against Terror, THE JAGMIRE (June 20, 2009), http://jagmire.blogspot.com/ 
2009/06/race-against-terror-by-nicholas-gage.html (maintaining that Prime 
Minister Simitis appointed Chrysochoidis, a novice in law enforcement, to fill 
the position of minister of public order).   
75 See Athens Beefs Up Security, EDMONTON JOURNAL, Dec. 19, 2000, at D8 
(reporting that Chrysochoidis met with foreign security experts and ambassadors 
prior to Greece hosting the Olympics); see also Greece Seeks British Help on 
Olympic Security, NEWS LETTER, Jan. 24, 2002 (recognizing that Chrysochoidis’ 
focus prior to the Olympics in Greece consisted of creating a plan to prevent 
N17 terrorist activity). 
76 See Former Deputy Prosecutor Yiannis Diotis to Head Up SDOE, ATHENS 
NEWS AGENCY, May 2, 2011 (stating that Yiannis Diotis was Greece’s former 
public prosecutor); see also Race Against Terror, supra note 74 (showing that 
special prosecutor Diotis and Chrysochoidis worked together to defeat N17).  
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article).  This team was unique in that it established for the first 
time the infrastructure to make meaningful use of evidence as it 
was collected and analyzed.77  Surprisingly, the Greek national 
police did not have an intelligence bureau, nor did they collate 
information from all N17 operations into one investigative 
system.78  Instead, N17 operations were filed and interpreted as 
separate crimes, rather than analyzed as part of the continuing 
operations of one criminal enterprise.79  Finally, Chrysochoidis 
ordered the creation of an intelligence bureau within the national 
police and a fresh and comprehensive scouring of the files for any 
overlooked or unmatched clues.80  The assorted files revealed an 
evident connection between N17’s proclamations and France.81  
Because a French newspaper was one of the two that received 
N17’s initial proclamation, 82  it is surprising that earlier 
investigators failed to follow this lead for a connection to France.  
The antiterrorism unit and the new intelligence division cooperated 
and compiled a list of Greek activists in Paris during the junta 
years where only one name remained unaccounted for—
Alexandros Giotopolous.83  Decades earlier, France’s antiterrorism 
                                                
77 See Interview with Michalis Chrisochoidis, Former Greek Minister of Public 
Order (notes on file with author); see also COUNTER-TERRORISM: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 342–43 (Ana María Salinas De Frías, Katja 
L. H. Samuel & Nigel D. White eds., 2012) (presenting the changes as proposed 
by the Minister of Public Order in the acquisition and use of information by 
Greek authorities to more effectively combat domestic terrorism). 
78 See Interview of Michalis Chrisochoidis, Former Greek Minister of Public 
(notes on file with author). 
79 Id. 
80  See id.; see also Race Against Terror, supra note 74 (indicating that 
Chrysochoidis created an intelligence section to review N17’s attacks upon 
learning that there was not one). 
81  See Interview of Michalis Chrisochoidis, supra note 77; see also 
Correspondent: A Greek Tragedy, BBC NEWS (Mar. 18, 2001), http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/audio_video/programmes/correspondent/transcripts/1
205893.txt (connecting N17 with France through an N17 statement in the Leftist 
French newspaper, Liberation). 
82 See Correspondent: A Greek Tragedy, BBC NEWS (Mar. 18, 2001), news.bbc. 
co.uk/hi/english/static/audio_video/programmes/correspondent/transcripts/1205
893.txt (noting that N17’s first proclamations appeared in the French newspaper 
Liberation); see also Race Against Terror, supra note 74 (noting that N17 
released a statement about the killing of Welch to three Greek newspapers and 
one French newspaper). 
83 See Interview of Michalis Chrisochoidis, supra note 77; see also Profile: 
November 17 Mastermind, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/ 
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authorities had Giotopolous on file for carrying false papers, and, 
together with information Greek authorities unknowingly 
possessed, provided investigators with fingerprints, a physical 
description, and other helpful information on the man who would 
soon be revealed as the leader of N17.84    
In June 2002, the unsuccessful investigation of N17 finally 
changed.  The son of a priest who worked as a part-time 
iconographer planted a homemade bomb at the ticket office of a 
ferry company in Piraeus. 85   During preparations, the bomb 
exploded prematurely and left the operative alive but in critical 
condition.86  This was the break the authorities needed.  In the 
operative’s possession was a handgun that later proved to be the 
murder weapon in two earlier N17 assassinations as well as a set of 
keys that would soon expose the underbelly of the organization.87  
In the operative’s apartment, Greek authorities found the 
typewriter on which the N17 manifestos were produced, plans for 
future operations and other incriminating forensic information that 
would confirm the identities of other N17 members, including a 
fingerprint of Giotopolous.88  As the N17 operative lay on the 
                                                                                                         
3300129.stm (last updated Dec. 8, 2003, 4:28 PM) (stating that Giotopoulos was 
arrested for being the mastermind of the N17 group). 
84 See Nicholas Gage, Race Against Terror, VANITY FAIR, Jan. 2007, at 64, 66 
(depicting the joint efforts of French and Greek intelligence agencies leading to 
the discovery of N17 leader Alexandros Giotopolous); see also Interview with 
Michalis Chrisochoidis, supra note 77. 
85  See Kate Connolly, Greek Terrorists Face Multiple Life Sentences, 
TELEGRAPH, Dec. 9, 2003, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/Europe 
/greece/1448923/Greek-terrorists-face-multiple-life-sentences.html (describing 
the botched bombing attempt and subsequent capture of N17 member Savas 
Xyros); see also Interview with Michalis Chrisochoidis, supra note 77. 
86 See David Pallister, Greek Police Find Terror Group’s Hideout, GUARDIAN, 
July 4, 2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/jul/05/davidpallister 
(recounting that the untimely blast of the bombing left Xyros hospitalized in 
critical condition); see also Greece: Police Find More Weapons, SKY NEWS 
(July 6, 2002, 1:57 PM), http://news.sky.com/story/111677/greece-police-find-
more-weapons (noting that Greek police detained Xyros following the 
premature explosion and took him to a hospital). 
87 See Pallister, supra note 86 (outlining the terrorist paraphernalia found both at 
the scene of Xyros’ botched bombing as well as several N17 hideouts linked to 
Xyros); see also Interview with Michalis Chrisochoidis, supra note 77. 
88  See Anthee Carassava, Greeks Claim Victory Over Terrorist Group But 
Questions About Suspects’ Ties Remain, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2002, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/19/world/greeks-claim-victory-over-terrorist-
group-but-questions-about-suspects-ties.html?n=Top%2fReference%2fTimes% 
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hospital bed, the government now possessed more tools to 
disassemble N17 than they had ever had before.       
 
III. The Evolution of Greece’s Legal Tools 
 
A. Law 774/79  
 
When CIA officer Welch was assassinated by N17 in 1975 
the evidence was formulated to treat Welch’s death as a homicide 
rather than a terrorist assassination.89  The Greek penal code had 
generally contained laws covering various crimes inherent to 
terrorism-related activities, such as assault and homicide. 90  
However, because Greece was contemplating its anti-mafia laws at 
that time, its legal orientation was directed toward a criminal 
enterprise, and Parliament resisted the idea of adopting legislation 
specifically covering the misunderstood phenomenon of 
terrorism.91  Typifying New Democracy and PASOK’s political 
posture, the former sought specific legislation as a means to 
enhance security while the latter interpreted such measures as the 
                                                                                                         
20Topics%2fSubjects%2fT%2fTerrorism (describing how Xyros’ capture led 
Greek police to incriminating evidence concerning N17 members and exposed 
its leader Alexandros Giotopolous); see also Interview with Michalis 
Chrisochoidis, supra note 77. 
89 See John Crewdson, The Murder That Sparked Identities Protection Act, CHI. 
TRIB., Mar. 12, 2006, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-03-
12/news/0603120383_1_spy-then-cia-director-william-colby-intelligence-
identities-protection-act (noting that the assassination of CIA officer Richard 
Welch was initially labeled a homicide). 
90 See Carol Migdalovitz, Greece, in EUROPEAN COUNTERTERRORIST EFFORTS: 
POLITICAL WILL AND DIVERSE RESPONSES 59 (Susan Boriotti & Donna Dennis 
eds., 2004) (suggesting that State laws reflected the Greeks’ perception that the 
police and government were a greater threat to their safety than terrorists); see 
also Andreas G. Banoutsos, Mapping the Development of Anti-Terror 
Legislation in Greece in the Aftermath of 9/11, RESEARCH INST. FOR EUR. & AM. 
STUDIES (2007), available at http://www.rieas.gr/research-areas/editorial/485. 
html (noting that the way Greek governments initially faced terrorism was by 
voting and ratifying international agreements rather than incorporating 
counterterrorism efforts into Greek penal law). 
91 See KATHLEEN MALLEY-MORRISON, STATE VIOLENCE AND THE RIGHT TO 
PEACE: WESTERN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 94 (2009) (noting that although 
an anti-terrorist bill was introduced in 1978, Greek authorities considered 
terrorism an ephemeral phenomenon); see also Karyotis, supra note 4, at 277 
(arguing that the lack of any coherent strategy in Greece’s response to terrorism 
could be partially attributed to its misconceptions about the nature of domestic 
terrorism). 
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curtailment of the civil rights gained from the fight against the 
junta.92  Despite stiff political opposition, New Democracy passed 
Law 774 in 1979, which defined a number of specific terrorism-
related felonies, including providing refuge to terrorists.93  Also 
among its measures were the death penalty and a financial 
incentive program for informants.94  In the 1981 elections PASOK 
persuaded voters that these expanded powers were a throwback to 
the suppressive policies of the junta and repealed Law 774 in 
1983.95 
 
B. Modifying Greece’s Constitution 
  
Greece’s Constitution had been interpreted to mean 
amnesty was available under certain circumstances for politically 
motivated crimes.96  In addition, according to Article 97, a political 
crime could only be tried by a mixed court comprised of regular 
                                                
92 See Kassimeris, supra note 54, at 157 (explaining how New Democracy 
believed the existing Greek penal code was insufficient, necessitating the 
introduction of special legislation for the fight against terrorism); see also 
Nikolas Kolaitis, Foreign & Domestic Terrorism in Greece, 2 INT’L J. BECCA 
at 22 (2012) (demonstrating that the evolution of counterterrorism policies was 
disfigured by the lack of unity and action between members of parliament). 
93 See Bossis, supra note 68, at 139 (stating that Law 774 defined specific 
terrorist felonies); see also Interview with Yianni Diotis, Former N17 Special 
Prosecutor (notes on file with author). 
94 Id. (explaining that the sentences introduced for the various terrorism-related 
crimes were very heavy); see also Interview with Yianni Diotis, supra note 93. 
95 See Kassimeris, supra note 54, at 164 (illustrating that PASOK used Law 774 
as a device for gaining greater coercive powers over the people); see also 
Karyotis, supra note 4, at 277, available at http://cac.sagepub.com/cgi/content 
/abstract/42/3/271 (stating that Law 774 was repealed soon after PASOK came 
into power in 1981). 
96 See 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 47 §§ 3, 4 (Greece), 
available at http://www.photius.com/countries/greece/government/syntagma.pdf 
(stating that amnesty for political crimes may be granted only by a statute 
approved by the Plenum of the Parliament with a three-fifths vote by its 
members as opposed to amnesty for common crimes, which may never be 
granted); see also Donysios Spinellis, Greece, in L’HARMONISATION DES 
SANCTIONS PÉNALES EN EUROPE 89, 93, available at http://halshs.archives-
ouvertes.fr/docs/00/41/96/45/PDF/RAPPORTS_NATIONAUX_-_Greece_-
_Donysios_SPINELLIS.pdf (defining the purpose of amnesty provisions such as 
Article 47 §§ 3 and 4 as a means of appeasing violent social and political 
conflicts). 
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judges and jurors.97   Finally, the Constitution did not permit 
extradition if the defendant was a foreign national fighting for 
political change in his home country.98 (Art. 5, § 2).  While it is 
unclear how frequently these provisions were actually exercised, 
they remained a post-Ottoman institutional testament to Greece’s 
sympathy for those politically oppressed and left no alternative but 
to raise arms in political opposition.  
Greece’s constitutional legacy was to conflict with the 
emerging legislative powers of the E.U.99  In 1988, Greece ratified 
the European Counter-Terrorism Convention that provided terrorist 
crimes would not be considered political acts or politically-
motivated crimes.100  The implications of ratifying this convention 
are significant, rendering terrorists ineligible for amnesty, revoking 
                                                
97 See 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 97 § 1 (Greece), available at 
http://www.photius.com/countries/greece/government/syntagma.pdf (stating that 
political crimes are subject to the legal remedies specified by law in mixed jury 
courts); see also THE CONSEQUENCES OF COUNTERRORISM 46 (Martha 
Crenshaw ed., 2010) (distinguishing political crimes tried by a mixed jury under 
Article 97 of the Constitution from all terrorism-related crimes which fall under 
the jurisdiction of Greece’s Criminal Court of Appeals).   
98 See 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5 § 2 (Greece), available at 
http://www.photius.com/countries/greece/government/syntagma.pdf (indicating 
that all persons living within the Greek territories shall enjoy its protections, but 
prohibiting the extradition of aliens prosecuted for their actions as “freedom-
fighters”); see also 1 Media, Advertising, & Entertainment Law Throughout the 
World § 14A:2 (2012) (specifying that Article 5 § 2 of Greece’s Constitution, 
which provides equal protection of the law to aliens, is relevant when 
interpreting its media laws).   
99 See M. Isabel Medina, Celebrating the Jurisprudence of Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsberg: Real Differences and Stereotypes -- Two Visions of Gender, 
Citizenship, and International Law, 7 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 315, 351–52 (2004) 
(specifying how the European Union is pressuring Greece to adopt norms 
prohibiting gender bias within the nation state); see also Mary Ellen Tsekos, 
Note, The New European Union Directive on Sexual Harassment and Its 
Implications for Greece, 10 WTR HUM. RTS. 31, 32 (2003) (stating how Greek 
law on sexual harassment will yield to the European Union’s newest 
amendments, which take precedent over Greece’s local laws). 
100  See Dionysios Spinellis, Note, Terrorism, 57 RHDI 445, 460 (1994) 
(indicating how Greece hesitated to ratify the treaty for years and finally was 
among the member states that ratified it in 1988); see also COMMITTEE OF 
EXPERTS ON TERRORISM, PROFILES ON COUNTER-TERRORIST CAPACITY, 
GREECE, 5 (2012), available at http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/3_CODEX 
TER/Working_Documents/CODEXTER%20Profiles%20_2012_%20Greece_E
N.pdf (illustrating that Greece signed the European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism on December 27, 1977, but ratified the convention in 
1988).    
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the right to a mixed court trial and exposing persons to extradition 
for the crimes committed.101  This agreement resonated throughout 
Parliament and identified the controversial legislative changes 
Greece needed to adopt as a member of the E.U. in the wake of 
terrorism.102     
 
C. Law 1916/90 
 
In 1989 New Democracy Prime Minister Pavlos 
Bakoyiannis was assassinated by N17.103  Bakoyiannis was the 
first member of Parliament to be killed by terrorists, and his death 
inspired his wife Dora, later to be Greece’s Foreign Minister, to 
assume his seat in Parliament, where she came to symbolize the 
policy distinctions between New Democracy and PASOK.104  New 
Democracy returned to office in 1990 and shortly thereafter 
enacted Law 1916, “Law for the Protection of Society against 
Organized Crime.”105  Law 1916 copied many of the provisions of 
                                                
101 See Aaron J. Noteboom, Comment, Terrorism: I Know It When I See It, 81 
OR. L. REV. 553, 574 (2002) (acknowledging that although the European 
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism provides a scope of political 
offenses, it also provides a member state with an option to recognize political 
offenses and to refuse extradition); see also Antje C. Petersen, Note, Extradition 
and the Political Offense Exception in the Suppression of Terrorism, 67 IND. L.J. 
767, 782 (1992) (stating that the purpose of the European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism was to ensure that terrorist acts do not escape 
prosecution by emphasizing effective extradition procedures). 
102 See Miltiadis Fakitsas, The Rise and Fall of Terrorist Organizations in Post-
Dictatorial Greece: The Role and the Lessons for the Intelligence Services 29–
30 (June 2003) (unpublished thesis Naval Postgraduate School)  available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a417464.pdf (discussing the legislative 
changes made in accordance with terrorism in Greece).  
103 See Marlise Simons, Greek Lawmaker is Slain in Athens, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 
27, 1989, http://www.nytimes.com/1989/09/27/world/greek-lawmaker-is-slain-
in-athens.html (reporting the death of Greek politician Pavlos Bakoyiannis); see 
also William D. Montalbano, Greek Scandal Turns Deadly as Terrorists Gun 
Down Lawmaker, L.A. TIMES, Sep. 27, 1989, http://articles.latimes.com/1989-
09-27/news/mn-142_1_greek-scandal (indicating that Paylos Bakoyiannis had 
been murdered by the terrorist group N17).  
104  See Biography for Dora Bakoyannis, SILO BREAKER, (Jan. 15, 2009), 
available at http://news.silobreaker.com/biography-for-dora-bakoyannis-
5_2260517690554712064_4 (showing the number of times Dora Bakyoannis 
was elected under the New Democracy banner). 
105 See ELECTIONS IN EUROPE: A DATA HANDBOOK 830 (Dieter Nohlen & Philip 
Stöver eds. 2010) (documenting the results of the Greek elections in 1990); see 
also Law No. 1916 on the Protection of Society against Organized Crime, 
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its predecessor, Law 774, but it was still not a law specifically 
oriented toward terrorism.106  While Law 1916 left out the death 
penalty, a provision bitterly opposed in 774, it significantly 
expanded police powers and their ability to collect evidence.107  
The law was controversial because it empowered the authorities to 
deny media the right to publish terrorist proclamations following a 
lethal attack.108  However, freedom of the press advocates fiercely 
rejected the new law and defiantly published the next N17 release 
following the organization’s assassination of a Turkish diplomat.109  
Numerous editors were arrested and New Democracy was 
subsequently condemned at the polls for undermining Greece’s 
tradition of expanded civil rights. 110   In yet another political 
reversal, PASOK retook power in 1993 and repealed Law 1916 in 
the same year.111 
 
 
                                                                                                         
INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING INFORMATION NETWORK (2007), 
available at https://www.imolin.org/amlid/showLaw.do?law=6306&language= 
ENG&country=GRE (providing the date and legislation enacted in the Law for 
the Protection of Society against Organized Crime).  
106 See Kassimeris, supra note 54 (showing the development of Greek legislative 
responses to terrorism); see also Kolaitis, supra note 93, at 23 (2012) 
(discussing the changes in Greek laws as terrorist attacks occurred). 
107 See Interview with Yianni Diotis, supra note 93; see also Kolaitis, supra note 
92, at 24 (noting the opposition of PASOK members of Parliament to Law 774 
for its diminishing human liberties). 
108 See Interview with Yianni Diotis, supra note 93; see also George Kassimeris, 
What not to do When Dealing With Terrorism: The Greek Experience, 1 
DEMOCRACY & SEC. 105, 112 (2005) (discussing how such a response to 
terrorism can be more dangerous for a democratic society than terrorism itself). 
109 See Interview with Yianni Diotis, supra note 93; see also Kassimeris, supra 
note 67, at 266 (2004) (discussing the assassination of Turkish diplomat Cettin 
Gorgu by N17, which occurred on October 7, 1991). 
110  See John M. Nomikos, Terrorism, Media, and Intelligence in Greece: 
Capturing the 17 November Group, 20 INT’L J. INTELLIGENCE & 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 65, 69 (2007) (discussing the impact that Law 1916/90 
had on the mass media that caused the New Democracy party to lose power in 
government); see also Kolaitis, supra note 92, at 25 (Jan./June 2012) (explaining 
that the public and political fear that existed during Mitsotakis’ government due 
to the encroachment of the Greek people’s civil liberties helped terrorists 
weaken the government). 
111 See Banoutsos, supra note 90; see also Fakitsas, supra note 102, at 29–32 
(discussing the anti-terrorist laws of 1978 and 1990 and their effect on the two 
major political parties, PASOK and New Democracy). 
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D. Death of Brigadier Saunders and International 
Accountability 
 
After decades of assurances, there had been little noticeable 
improvement in Greece’s willingness and ability to dismantle its 
terrorist organizations.  As a result, Greece’s diplomatic relations 
continued to suffer.  The U.S. National Commission on Terrorism 
recommended designating Greece as a state “not cooperating fully” 
with U.S. counterterrorism efforts, and, in the U.S. State 
Department’s 1999 Annual Report, was referred to as “remaining 
one of the weakest links in Europe’s efforts against terrorism.”112  
There was little surprise therefore that relations with Greece 
reached a critical level in 2000 when British defense attaché 
Stephen Saunders was assassinated.113   
In what became a significant turning point in Greece’s 
awareness of its terrorist vulnerabilities, the Simitis administration 
initiated a comprehensive public relations campaign to contain the 
fallout.114  For the first time, Greece’s political leadership utilized 
all available media outlets to condemn the killing.115  In a rare 
                                                
112 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 1999, 33–36 
(April 2000), www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/annual_reports.html 
(discussing Greece’s weaknesses against terrorism); see also Olga Kallergi, 
Exporting U.S. Anti-Terrorism Legislation and Policies to the International Law 
Arena, a Comparative Study: The Effect on Other Countries' Legal Systems, 
CORNELL LAW SCHOOL INTER-UNIVERSITY GRADUATE STUDENT CONFERENCE 
PAPERS, 5–9  (Apr. 16, 2005) http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent 
.cgi?article=1018&context=lps_clacp (discussing actions the Greek government 
has taken to mitigate the terrorist threat in Greece, thereby improving relations 
with the United Kingdom and the United States). 
113 See Nomikos, supra note 110 (discussing the impact that the assassination of 
Stephen Saunders had on the Greek government’s response to terrorism and 
hunting for N17 members); see also British Diplomat Shot Dead in Athens, BBC 
NEWS, June 8, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/782245.stm (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2013) (detailing the assassination of military attaché Brigadier Stephen 
Saunders). 
114 See Associated Press, Greek Officials Condemn March in Support of ‘Nov. 
17’ Terrorists, WALL ST. J. EUROPE, Oct. 3, 2002, at A3 (discussing the vocal 
methods Greek government members undertook to express to the Greek people 
and the world that terrorism would not be tolerated); see also Erlanger, supra 
note 61 (highlighting the increased utilization of police powers to crack down on 
terror following the Saunders assassination). 
115 See David Holley, Greece Tightens Noose on Guerillas; Terrorism: Police 
Arrest a Suspected Leader of a Notorious Group and Name a Gunman in the 
1975 Assassination of a CIA Agent in Athens, L.A. TIMES, July 27, 2002, at 1 
(detailing how the government utilized nationally televised speeches to reach the 
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display of unity, government officials collectively proclaimed N17 
a threat to Greece’s democratic values and way of life.116  The 
campaign extended to antiterrorism messages, including numerous 
television appearances by Saunders’ widow, and fresh 
parliamentary debates on how to enhance Greece’s security and 
legal capabilities.117  For the first time, popular sentiment began to 
coalesce against the recognized domestic threat.118  Greece sought 
to assure the international community of its sincere antiterrorism 
efforts and to make clear that such attacks were not a legitimate 
continuation of the social movements popular in the ‘70s and 
‘80s.119  Greece’s leadership was determined to strip N17 of the 
                                                                                                         
masses with anti-terror messages); see also CP Wire, British Brigadier Shot 
Dead; Greek Terrorists Suspected, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, June 9, 2002, at B1 
(highlighting the publication of an interview with a CIA agent on the topic of 
Greek terrorism in a Greek weekly newspaper). 
116  See Greek Terror Suspects Set to Challenge Prison Trial, DOW JONES 
INTERNATIONAL NEWS, Mar. 3, 2003 (underscoring the impacts from attacks by 
November 17 and threats posed to Greek democratic values by this violence); 
see also Anthee Carassava, 6 From Greek Terror Group Get Life Sentences, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2003, at A15 (describing Marxist and Stalinist tactics 
utilized by the November 17 terrorists that undermine and counteract existing 
democratic values). 
117 See Stephanie Nolen, After 30 Years, Greek Police Finally Crack Terrorist 
Cell; Obscure November 17 Had Eluded Capture; Despite 23 Killings and 
Dozens of Bombings, THE GLOBE & MAIL, July 19, 2002, at A3 (detailing the 
increased scrutiny by Greek police on terrorist suspects and the end of impunity 
for November 17 members); see also Carassava, supra note 116, at A15 
(examining Greek sentencing practices and implications of harsh sentencing on 
terrorism and public perceptions of Greek measures). 
118 See Geoff Winestock, A Chink in Terror’s Armor; In Greece, Public Outrage 
Turns Tables on November 17 Group, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 2002, at A12 
(commenting on the change in Greek sentiment surrounding the November 17 
terrorist organization); see also Daniel Williams, Greece Catches Up To Elusive 
Terrorists; Arrests May Snuff Out November 17 Group, WASH. POST, July 19, 
2002, at A1 (describing how both Greek and Western observers viewed the 
increased pressure on November 17 by Greek police as the beginning of the end 
for the terrorist group). 
119 See Greek Officials Condemn March in Support of ‘Nov. 17’ Terrorists, 
WALL ST. J. EUROPE, Oct. 3, 2002, at A3 (analyzing the response of Greek 
officials and attempts to distance Greece from terrorism in light of support for 
November 17); see also Erlanger, supra note 61, at A1 (illustrating how Greece 
took measures with direct intention to curry favor in the international 
community and to repair the Greek image). 
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façade of popular support from which it derived so much mystery 
and power.120     
The parallel component to Greece’s diplomatic initiative 
was its effort to improve security cooperation with Britain and the 
U.S.  Barely a month after Saunders’ death, Minister 
Chrysochoidis, Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou, and British 
Ambassador Madden assembled for a counterterrorism summit on 
how to reform Greece’s antiterrorism policies. 121   Valuable 
recommendations were made during the summit, including ways to 
reorganize Greece’s security forces by constructing a single 
antiterrorism body modeled after Britain’s counterterrorism 
department. 122   British officials also proposed sophisticated 
surveillance techniques and enhancements in the use of media 
instruments.123  Efforts formalized when the two countries agreed 
to joint antiterrorism exercises and the mutual exchange of 
intelligence.124  In a similar spirit, Greece and the U.S. signed a 
                                                
120 See Michalis Chrysochoidis, Fighting Organized Crime and Terrorism for 
Security and Stability in the Balkans, WILSON CENTER (Sept. 7, 2000), 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/fighting-organized-crime-and-
terrorism-for-security-and-stability-the-balkans (observing that public dialogue 
over terrorism and the assassinations continued for weeks after Saunders’ 
death); see also Tally Kritzman, Greek Counter Terrorism, Have the Lessons 
Been Learned?, INT’L POL’Y INST. FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM (Aug. 8, 2000), 
http://212.150.54.123/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=124 (explaining that 
Saunders’ murder prompted Greek citizens to hold a moment of silence for the 
assassinations and the government to broadcast anti-terrorism messages). 
121 See ICT, Greek Counterterrorism; Symbolic Steps, INT’L POL’Y INST. FOR 
COUNTER-TERRORISM (Aug. 8, 2000) www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/frame.html 
(stating that the anti-terrorism seminar was held on July 11th and 12th in 2000); 
see also Greece Proposes New Anti-Terrorism Measure, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 
2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/06/13/world/greece-proposes-new-anti-
terrorism-measures.html (declaring that Greece will be working with the Europe 
and the United States to combat terrorism). 
122 See ICT, supra note 121 (noting that soon after the seminar, the British 
assisted Greece in reorganizing its security forces); see also Kallergi, supra note 
112 (explaining that British authorities assisted the Greek government in 
organizing a single anti-terrorism entity).  
123 See ICT, supra note 121 (observing that the British introduced the idea of 
using the media to fight against terrorism in Greece); see also Kallergi, supra 
note 112 (writing that sophisticated surveillance techniques were suggested for 
the first time by the British).  
124 See ICT, supra note 121 (noticing that Britain played a dominant role in 
Greece’s battle against terrorism); see also Chrysochoidis, supra note 120 
(observing that Greece was making strides it its fight against terrorism by 
teaming up with fellow European countries). 
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cooperation agreement covering informational and investigative 
support for crimes involving the two countries.125  The U.S. also 
encouraged Greece to overhaul its antiterrorism laws by making a 
series of specific recommendations,126 many of which would be 
included in Greece’s next legislation.  
 
E. Law 2928/01 
 
After so many lethal attacks had gone unanswered, Greece 
was politically prepared for tough legislation.  Finally, Law 2928 
was created in 2001, after grueling debates between ruling PASOK 
and minority New Democracy.127  Despite popular acclaim, the 
legislation was presented as anti-mafia and lacked an explicit 
reference to terrorism itself.128  Yet, its applications to the war on 
terror were unmistakable.  Law 2928 provided important tools for 
Greek authorities to combat terror, including: defining an 
organization for the first time; promoting reward for information 
incentives; creating a witness protection program; allowing for 
                                                
125 See ICT, supra note 121 (writing that attorney general Janet Reno met with 
the Greek Minister to sign the cooperation agreement), see also Tally Kritzman, 
Greece, U.S. to Sign Counter-Terrorism Agreement (Sept. 5, 2000), 
http://212.150.54.123/spotlight/det.cfm?id=479 (noting that Minister 
Chrysochoidis signed a bilateral police cooperation agreement in Washington). 
126  See Daniel V. Speckhard, Citizen Protection Minister Upbeat on 
Reorganization, Cooperation, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 11, 2011, http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/246265 (stating that the 
Hellenic Coast Guard was to be reorganized to model the U.S. Coast Guard); see 
also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2010 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM, available at 
http://www.state.gov/ documents/organization/170479.pdf (reporting that Greek 
officials worked with U.S. officials in training to strengthen border security 
from terrorism). 
127 See Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, 
DOW JONES FACTIVA, Sep. 24, 2001 (stating that both the criminal and criminal 
procedure code of Greece have changed dramatically after Law 2928 was 
passed); see also Kolaitis, supra note 92, at 25 (2012) (recognizing that in 
response to Greece’s most deadly terrorist attack, Law 2829 was passed). 
128 See Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 2005 Counter-
Terrorism Legislation and Practice: A Survey of Selected Countries, 
http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Politics/documents/2005/10/12/ 
foreignterrorlaw1.pdf  (last visited Jan. 28, 2013) (stating that Law 2928 allows 
a foreign national to be expelled if he belongs to a mafia organization); see also 
ADVANCED INST. OF LEGAL STUDIES, Study – National Means of Implementation 
of Third Pillar Instruments, http://ials.sas.ac.uk/postgrad/docs/GROTIUSGR 
Vol2.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2013) (finding that amendments to Law 2928 to  
prevent organized crime). 
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mitigating exchanges, such as turning state’s evidence; 
immunizing government approved spies; allowing the use of DNA 
evidence; extending the time allowed to lawfully question 
suspects; approving the use of broader interrogation methods; and 
creating more severe punishments for terrorism-related crimes.129    
Also, as amended by Law 2928, Article 187, Section 1 of 
the Criminal Code provided that crimes committed by a criminal 
organization, irrespective of the crime itself, fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Criminal Court of Appeals.130  One component 
of this was the creation of the “special court,” which, in contrast to 
the historic “mixed court,” eliminated the use of jurors, due in 
large part to their susceptibility to tampering, and instead 
established a three-judge panel.131  Finally, Law 2928 also helped 
facilitate the processing of investigation warrants by requiring the 
approval of only one judge where national security matters were 
involved.132 
 
F. September 11th and the E.U.’s Legislative Response 
 
The scale and daring of the September 11th attacks changed 
the perception of terrorism forever.133  Shortly after the attacks the 
                                                
129 See Interview with Yianni Diotis, supra note 93; see also Ariane Chebel 
D’Appollonia, FRONTIERS OF FEAR: IMMIGRATION AND INSECURITY IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 84 (Cornell Univ. Press, 2012) (stating that Law 
2928 lists twenty-two offenses that are categorized as terrorist attacks). 
130 See Interview with Yianni Diotis, supra note 93; see generally Odysseas 
Elytis, Imprisoned in Conflict – Cooperation and the Law, available at 
http://www.alba.edu.gr/uploads/Voliotis_article.pdf (explaining that Law 2928 
allows for more lenient sentencing of members of organized crime). 
131 See Interview with Yianni Diotis, supra note 93; see also Kallergi, supra note 
112, at 9 (2005) (stating that under Law 2928, all crimes of terrorism are tried 
without a jury). 
132 See COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, The Practical Application of the 
European Arrest Warrant and Corresponding Surrender Procedures Between 
Member States, at 7–9  (Oct. 20, 2008), available at http://www.asser.nl/default. 
aspx?site_id=8&level1=10789&level2=10860&level3=11107 (explaining that 
the Public Prosecutorat the Court of Appeals in Greece retains the authority to 
issue European Arrest Warrants); see also Interview with Yianni Diotis, supra 
note 93. 
133 See Sudha Setty, What’s in a Name? How Nations Define Terrorism Ten 
Years After 9/11, 33 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1, 3–10 (discussing how countries 
struggled to define terrorism post-9/11) (2011); see also Rosa Ehrenreich 
Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of Armed 
Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 676–86 (2004) (stating 
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European Council adopted the European Plan of Action and 
thereafter drafted the E.U. Framework Decision on Combating 
Terrorism.134  The Framework Decision, requiring compliance by 
all E.U. member states, provided for more than 70 antiterrorism 
related measures.  Of these measures, most notable were 
provisions which established a common definition of terrorism; a 
European arrest warrant; an extension of the statute of limitations 
for terror-related killings from twenty to thirty years; harsher 
penalties; a list of terrorist organizations; a list of persons related to 
terrorist organizations; and measures to suppress terrorist 
financing.135  While Greece did not comply with the Framework 
Decision until June of 2004, the anticipated implications of the 
antiterrorism legislation immediately set the scope and direction of 





                                                                                                         
that globalization has obscured the traditional legal boundaries of armed conflict 
and national security law). 
134 See Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council 
Meeting on 21 Sept. 2001, CONSILIUM, 15–17 (2001), available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140.en.p
df (last visited Jan. 19, 2013) (announcing the adoption of a European arrest 
warrant to combat terrorism); see also European Union: Council of the 
European Union, Council Framework Decision 2002/475, art. 1, O.L.J. 2008, 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f5342994.html (providing a 
uniform definition of terrorism for European Union member countries). 
135 See Jack Straw, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
Counter-Terrorism Legislation and Practice: A Survey of Selected Countries, 
15–16 (Oct., 2005), available at http://image.guardian.co.uk/sysfiles/Politics/ 
documents/2005/10/12/foreignterrorlaw1.pdf (indicating that Law 2928 provides 
the Greek authorities with broader means to investigate a suspected terrorist 
group); see also Eugenia Dumitriu, The E.U.’s Definition of Terrorism: The 
Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, 5 GERMAN L. J. 5, 586, 
591–95 (2004) (emphasizing that the EU Framework Decision distinguishes 
between three types of offenses: terrorist offenses, offenses relating to a terrorist 
group, and offences linked to terrorist activities). 
136 See Banoutsos, supra note 90 (noting that prior to the Athens Olympic Games 
in 2004 the Greek Parliament enacted Law 3251 known as the "European Arrest 
Warrant and the Confrontation of Terrorism”); see also European Arrest 
Warrant, Amendment to Law 2928/2001 on Criminal Organizations and Other 
Provisions, CONSILIUM, 1 (2004), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/polju/en/EJN636.pdf (defining the parameters of the 
European Arrest Warrant, Law 3251, within the Greek Penal Code). 
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G. Dismantling and Prosecuting N17 
 
As the N17 operative lay on the hospital bed, Law 2928 
allowed Greek authorities to use broader interrogation methods and 
more time to conduct lawful questioning.137 Initially the operative, 
coming in and out of consciousness, was not treated as a suspect 
but rather as a material witness.  Thus, Greek authorities avoided 
the legal obligation to charge him or release him within twenty-
four hours.138  Investigators feared publicity might scare other N17 
members into hiding, and this extra time enabled them to connect 
the handgun to other N17 murders, as well as to collect other 
useful evidence from the apartment.139  Under interrogation, the 
operative—and later his two brothers—revealed essential 
information about the organization and its members, including the 
mastermind known as “O Psilos,” the “Tall One.”140  In the next 
month the authorities canvassed Greece, arresting the remaining 
members, and confirmed the “Tall One” was indeed Alexandros 
Giotopolous living under a false identity.141  Shortly thereafter he 
was captured on a ferryboat departing a Greek island with forged 
documents.142  In retrospect, it is remarkable that Chrysochoidis’ 
                                                
137  See DAVID CANTER, THE FACES OF TERRORISM: MULTIDISCIPLINARY 
PERSPECTIVES 98 (John Wiley & Sons, 2009) (discussing the hospital bed 
interrogation of Savvas Xiros that led to the dismantling of the 17N); see also 
George Gilson, Judges Deliberate on Verdict in 17N Case, ATHENS NEWS, 
(Nov. 28, 2003), http://www.athensnews.gr/old_issue/13042/10618 (reporting 
that a defense attorney for Savvas argued that Savvas’ confession was drug 
induced and exacted through torture). 
138 See Interview with Yianni Diotis, supra note 93; see also George Kassimeris, 
Greece: the Persistence of Political Terrorism, 89 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1, 
131 (2013) (describing how a premature bomb explosion severely wounded the 
operative, giving port authorities an opportunity to investigate). 
139 See Interview with Yianni Diotis, supra note 93; see also Kassimeris, supra 
note 139 (identifying the handgun collected from the injured operative as the 
weapon stolen from a police officer killed by N17, hence connecting the 
operative to the terrorist organization). 
140 See Interview with Yianni Diotis, supra note 93; see also Kassimeris, supra 
note 68, at 271 (noting that Alexandros Giotopolous denied involvement with 
N17 throughout his trial). 
141 See Interview with Yianni Diotis, supra note 93; see also Kallergi, supra note 
113, at 9 (crediting new technology in Greece for the successful surveillance and 
evidence collection tactics). 
142  See Interview with Yianni Diotis, supra note 93; see also Partial 
Declassification 12633/04, Evaluation of National Anti-Terrorist Arrangements 
Report about Greece, 14-16 October 2003, at 4, http://register.consilium.europa. 
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team accomplished an arrest in one month that had eluded Greek 
authorities for over twenty-six years.  
The trial of N17 became known as the “trial of the 
century”: there were nineteen defendants accused of twenty-three 
murders, one hundred and eighty-four attempted murders, and 
dozens of armed robberies and attacks; two hundred and seventy-
three prosecution witnesses; two hundred and thirty-six defense 
witnesses; thirty-eight prosecution attorneys; thirty-two defense 
attorneys; and a one thousand four hundred and twelve page 
indictment.  The trial began in March 2003.143   
One of the defendant’s statements best summarized N17’s 
legal strategy.  It was argued that crimes for which the defendants 
were accused were political, not criminal, and to be tried by a 
special court without jurors rather than in a mixed court would 
undermine Greece’s Constitution and would incorporate the legal 
policies of meddling foreign powers.144  The defendants further 
argued that the confessions forming the basis of the prosecution’s 
case should be inadmissible because they were obtained under 
coercion, threats of extradition, and unjust physical conditions.145 
These arguments became the subject of great debate in the court of 
public opinion, but ultimately proved unavailing at trial.146   
                                                                                                         
eu/pdf/en-/04/st12/st12633-ex01.en04.pdf (reporting on the Summer 2002 
capture of N17 members and subsequent dismantling of the organization). 
143 See MICHAILIS DIMITRIOU, JUROR AT THE TRIAL OF NOVEMBER 17, at 597 
(2004); see also Kallergi, supra note 113, at 10 (estimating that it would take 
approximately 47 hours to read the full indictment). 
144 See DIMITRIOU, supra note 143, at 31–32; see also Kallergi, supra note 113, 
at 12–13 (recognizing that N17 members’ constitutional rights to a mixed court 
were triumphed by Greece’s anti-terrorism laws giving special courts 
jurisdiction of all terrorists organized actions, including those political in 
nature). 
145 See  DIMITRIOU, supra note 143, at 31–32; see also Suspected N17 Terrorist 
Slams Court as ‘Biased, Unjust, and Illegal’, ATHENS NEWS AGENCY: DAILY 
NEWS BULLETIN IN ENGLISH, Mar. 5, 2003, http://www.hri.org/news/greek/ana/ 
2003/03-03-05.ana.html#06 (reporting N17 members’ claims that their 
confessions were coerced by threats and unfair treatment). 
146 See U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, supra note 62, at 75 (noting that N17 members 
were convicted on major felony charges rather than on political accounts); see 
also “N17” Actions “Criminal” & not “Political”, Appellate Court Council 
Says, ATHENS NEWS AGENCY: DAILY NEWS BULLETIN IN ENGLISH, Jan. 3, 2003, 
http://www.hri.org/news/greek/ana/2003/03-01-03.ana.html#15 (reporting that 
N17 members were charged with organized criminal offenses, which were not 
barred by the statute of limitation). 
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Greece, having ratified the European Counter-Terrorism 
Convention, could no longer consider such crimes political acts.147 
Further, broader use of interrogation methods was not found to be 
inconsistent with Law 2928, especially given the severity of N17’s 
threats.148  Ultimately, N17 defendants were convicted, but not 
under the terms that were popularly understood.149  N17 defendants 
were not prosecuted in a special court, but in a regular court. Also, 
they were not accused of terrorism-related crimes, but for 
organized crime offenses such as bank robbery.150  Just as the 
legendary syndicate boss Al Capone was convicted for tax evasion, 
N17 defendants were tried and convicted for crimes far less sinister 
than those for which they were known.151  Presumably, in the days 
preceding the Olympics, Greek prosecutors sought a definitive 
conviction uncomplicated by the politics of the special court.152  It 
                                                
147  See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, PROTOCOL AMENDING THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM 8 (2003) (amending to 
include an extended list of offenses that are to be depoliticized and treated as 
crimes); see also U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 
2003, 48 (2004) (acknowledging that Greece’s counterterrorism legislation 
actions would extend their definition of crime). 
148 See Interview with Yianni Diotas, supra note 93; see also U.S. DEP’T. OF 
STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2008, 76 (2009) (noting that N17 
terrorist conduct remains alive in Greece as convicted members continue posing 
threats to their government from prison cells). 
149 See U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, supra note 62, at 75 (noting that N17 members 
were convicted on 224 counts of organized crime offenses); see also “N17” 
Actions “Criminal” & not “Political”, Appellate Court Council Says, supra 
note 147 (reporting that the Athens appellate court decision labeled N17 terrorist 
behavior as organized crimes rather than political crimes). 
150 See Interview with Yianni Diotis, supra note 93; see also Hellenic Republic 
Embassy of Greece, N17 Member Admits participation in 27 Crimes, including 
Bakoyiannis’ Murder, July 20, 2012, available at http://www.greekembassy.org 
/embassy/Content/en/Article.aspx?office=2&folder=334&article=9867 (stating 
the masterminds of N17 were charged with organized crime). 
151 See Hellenic Republic Embassy of Greece, Life Sentences for “November 
17” Killers, 9 GREECE: A NEWS REVIEW FROM THE EMBASSY OF GREECE, PRESS 
& INFORMATION OFFICE, at 2 (Dec. 2003) (citing the terms of imprisonment 
fewer than those proposed by the prosecutor); see also ATHENS NEWS AGENCY 
DAILY NEWS BULLETIN [ENGLISH], “November 17” terrorist group trial 
verdicts passed down by criminal court, Mar. 12, 2009, available at 
http://www.hri.org/news/greek/ana/2003/03-12-09.ana.html (elaborating on the 
convictions of N17 members). 
152 See N17 leader, hitman jailed for life, CNN WORLD, (Dec. 17, 2003, 2:52 
AM) http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/12/17/greece.n17 
/index.html?iref=allsearch [hereinafter “CNN World Article”] (reciting the 
urgency to capture the N17 group before the 2004 Olympics); see also Hellenic 
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remains to be seen how the special court will be implemented and 
whether it is determined by the high court to be consistent with 
Greece’s Constitution. 
By December of 2003, most N17 defendants were 
convicted of multiple murders.  Many were given life sentences, 
including Giotopoulos, who was sentenced to twenty-one life 
terms.153  These sentences are unusually harsh, given Greece’s 
historically lenient penal policies.154 In Greece, a life term is 
limited to twenty-five years with eligibility for parole after sixteen 
years.  But for those sentenced to multiple life terms they may 
apply for parole after twenty years.155  It is worth noting that CIA 
station chief Richard Welch was never even mentioned in the trial 
as his assassination fell outside of Greece’s twenty-year statute of 
limitations.156    
 
IV.  Terrorism Prevention and the Olympics 
 
The Athens Olympic Games are essential to the study of 
Greece’s security policies given the significant input and 
coordination Greece received from many foreign participants.  In 
the wake of 9/11, the Iraq war, and the Madrid bombings, security 
concerns were raised to new heights.157  Many feared the premier 
                                                                                                         
Republic Embassy of Greece, supra note 151, at 2 (elaborating on the strong 
resolve to combat terrorism before the Olympic Games). 
153 See Interview with Yianni Diotis, supra note 93; see CNN World Article, 
supra note 153 (citing Giotopoulous’s guilty sentence). 
154 See Effi Lambropoulou, Crime, Criminal Justice and Criminology in Greece, 
2 EUR. J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 211, 212 (stating the leniency of the Greek criminal 
justice system); see also Dionysios Spinellis & Calliope Spinellis, Criminal 
Justice Systems in Europe and North America, THE EUROPEAN INST. FOR CRIME 
PREVENTION & CONTROL, at 3 (emphasizing the lenient sentencing or de-
penalization for certain offences). 
155 See Interview with Yianni Diotis, supra note 93; see also Eric L. Jensen, 
Sarah Browning & Courtney Waid, Life Imprisonment as a Penal Policy, 55 
REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE LOS ESTUDIOS VASCO [RIEV] INTL J. ON BASQUE 
STUDIES 115, 118 (2010) (noting Greece’s 25 year maximum life imprisonment 
term). 
156 See Mark Landler, Greek Court Convicts 15 in 27-Year Old Terror Group, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2003, at A3 (noting that the prosecutors in the court case 
did not bring charges for Richard Welch’s murder because the statute of 
limitations had expired); see also Interview with Yianni Diotis, supra note 94. 
157 See Cathryn L. Claussen, The Constitutionality of Mass Searches of Sports 
Spectators, 16 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 153, 153 (2006) (stating that due to 
terrorist activity around the world, the organizers of the 1996 Atlanta Olympic 
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international sporting event would become the locale for a 
spectacular terrorist attack.158  No athletic envoy could afford to 
disregard the events of 1972, when Israeli athletes were 
assassinated during the Munich Games.159  Therefore, the Athens 
Games became an important symbol of courage in the face of 
looming threats of terrorism. 
As part of the comprehensive pre-game security initiative, 
the Greek Parliament passed the antiterrorism law entitled 
“European Arrest Warrant and Confrontation of Terrorism.”160 
Legislation 3251/2004 amended the earlier antiterrorism law 
2928/2001 in part by specifically defining terrorism: 
 
[A]s an act committed in such a way or to such an extent or 
under such circumstances that it could seriously damage a 
country or an international organization, and is aimed at 
inducing fear among the population or forcing illegally any 
public authority or international organization to proceed to an 
act or to refrain proceeding to it or to seriously harm or 
destroy the fundamental constitutional, political or economic 
structure of a country or an international organization.161 
                                                                                                         
Games subjected spectators to bag searches); see also Clifford J. Levy, Uneasy 
Greeks Focus on Olympic Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2004, at A6 (emphasizing 
the need for security at the Athens Summer Olympics in response to renewed 
fears of terrorist attacks). 
158 See Benjamin T. Clark, Why the Airport and Courthouse Exceptions to the 
Search Warrant Requirement Should be Extended to Sporting Events, 40 VAL U. 
L. REV. 707, 737 (2006) (commenting that the likelihood of a terrorist threat at 
sporting events is real and substantial); see also Anthee Carassava, Greece Lists 
Terror Scares During Games, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2004, at A14 (indicating that 
following the September 11 attacks, Greece put in place the most expensive 
security ever when hosting the Olympics). 
159 See Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, The President’s Constitutional 
Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorist Organizations and 
the Nations that Harbor or Support Them, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 487, 
511 (2002) (acknowledging that it was members of the Black September group 
that killed eleven Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games); see also 
Michael A. Mogill, Eight Simple Rules for Stating My Dogma, 6 RUTGERS J.L. 
& RELIGION 3, 4 (2004) (noting that during the 1972 Munich Games, eleven 
Israeli athletes and coaches were seized and murdered by Palestinian militants). 
160 See Banoutsos, supra note 90; see also Kallergi, supra note 112, at 6 (noting 
that the Greek authorities took action before the Olympic Games in Athens by 
publicizing anti-terrorism messages). 
161 See Delegation of Greece, Information Exchange on the OSCE Code of 
Conduct on the Politico-Military Aspects of Security, FSC.EMI/105/08 (Apr. 
15, 2008) available at www.osce.org/fsc/3151 (commenting that the legislation 
of Act 3251/2004 amends Act 2928/2001). 
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The law cited over twenty types of offenses considered terrorist 
acts when committed under the above criteria. 162   Given the 
security concerns of the time, Greece had to open itself to much 
painful criticism, foreign intervention and endless negotiations 
over security administration.163  These negotiations culminated in 
Greece’s framework plans―strategic, directional, tactical, and 
operational schema―wherein there were clear delineations of 
command, responsibilities, and objectives, partially drawn upon 
the Sydney, Atlanta, and Salt Lake City models.164 
One of the security planning agencies created was the 
seven-nation Olympic Advisory Group.165  In coordination with 
the Hellenic Police, the Advisory Group participated in operational 
readiness exercises and partnership projects to improve 
intelligence and security functions.166  With almost 50,000 people 
trained to provide security at the Olympics, it became a project of 
monumental proportions.167  Greece quickly became the epicenter 
                                                
162 See Feridun Yenisey, Editor’s Letter, Some Legal Aspects of Terrorism in 
Western Europe and Turkey, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 643, 647 (2005) 
(noting the addition of twenty-two defined acts of terrorism to the Greek 
Criminal Code); see also Banoutsos, supra note 90. 
163 See Anthee Carassava, Doubts Mount Over Athens Olympics, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 17, 2003, at 10 (describing criticism of the poor security measures taken 
prior to the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens); see also Gregory L. Vistica, For 
Athens Olympics, A Security Gap; Tests Show Porous Defenses; Reports Cite 
Planning Breakdowns, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2003, at A01 (demonstrating the 
widespread foreign criticism of Greek security in Athens as well as the steps 
being taken to improve security). 
164  See Tom Hundley, Security at Games to Test Greek Mettle; Blasts 
Underscore Worries in Athens, CHI. TRIB., May 16, 2004, at C1 (finding the 
influence of previous Olympics on security planning for the Athens Olympics); 
see also Greek Ministry of Public Order Release, ELEFTHEROTYPIA, Dec. 30, 
2001 (discussing the negotiations that led to the international adoption of a 
framework for Olympics security). 
165 See Greek Ministry of Public Order Release, supra note 164 (remarking on 
the creation of the Olympic Advisory Group to provide guidance for the 
implementation of security procedures at the Athens Olympics); see also Pope 
Offers Blessings to Athens Organizers, WASH. POST, May 16, 2004, at E06 
(explaining the role of the United States in the Olympic Advisory Group). 
166 See Greece Gets Radiation Detectors, WASH. POST, May 26, 2004, at D07 
(providing an example of cooperation between Greek police and foreign nations 
for Olympics security); see also Greek Ministry of Public Order Release, supra 
note 164 (delineating the duties performed by the Olympic Advisory Group). 
167 See Athens Security Drill Comes Under Protest, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2004, 
at D02 (holding that the size of the Greek Olympics security force is nearly 
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of world security, evolving from the recommendations and strategy 
of the participating countries, and establishing a renowned security 
infrastructure where previously virtually none existed. 168   Its 
institutional preparedness made Greece an international authority 
on security practice.169    
 
V. Law 3875/2010: Ratification of The Palermo Protocol 
 
The most recent addition to Greece’s portfolio of 
antiterrorism legislation was adopted by Parliament as Law 3875 
in 2010. 170   Law 3875 is, in part, the ratification and 
implementation of the 2000 United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime, commonly known as one of the 
three Palermo Protocols. 171   The Protocol is oriented toward 
transnational organized crime—it includes a working definition of 
an organized criminal group, measures to combat money-
laundering, corruption, extradition, joint investigation, witness 
protection, and law enforcement cooperation—but Greece’s 
                                                                                                         
50,000); see also Greek Ministry of Public Order Release, supra note 164 
(establishing the enormous size of the security force for the Athens Olympics). 
168 See Minas Samatas, Security and Surveillance in the Athens 2004 Olympics: 
Some Lessons From a Troubled Story, 17 INT’L CRIM. J. REV. 220, 221 (2007) 
(describing how the 2004 Olympics became the biggest security operation in 
peacetime Europe); see also Anastassia Tsoukala, The Security Issue at the 2004 
Olympics, 3 EUR. J. SPORT & SOC’Y 43, 45 (2006) (stating that Greece created 
the most expensive security infrastructure in Olympic history and signed 38 
security agreements with 23 countries). 
169 See MIGDALOVITZ, supra note 9 (affirming that Greece took its role as 
Olympic host seriously and expended $1.2 billion on security); see also 
Samatas, supra note 168, at 221 (noting how Greece became the testing ground 
for the newest antiterrorist surveillance technology during the 2004 Olympics). 
170 See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, PROFILES ON COUNTER-TERRORISM CAPACITY: 
GREECE 2 (2012) (stating that Law 3875/2010 repealed paragraph 8 of Article 
187A of the Criminal Code); see also New Provisions of the “Anti”-terror Law, 
supra note 4 (demonstrating how in 2010 Greece expanded the scope of its 
terror law so that acts of resistance against the government would be considered 
terrorism).  
171 See THE GOVERNMENT OF GREECE, COMMENTS ON THE 21ST GREEK REPORT 
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER 1 (2011) 
(positing that Law 3875/2010 ratified the Palermo Convention and expanded the 
protection of human trafficking victims); see also AMNESTY INT’L ANNUAL 
REPORT 2011: GREECE, http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/greece/report-2011 
affirming that Law 3875/2010 implemented the 2000 UN Palermo Protocol in 
Greece). 
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accompanying domestic legislation modified the earlier 3251/2004 
law for more actionable counterterrorism significance.172      
 Law 3875 modifies Article 187 (¶¶ 3-6) of the Greek Penal 
Code, in part amending the following: 
 
(3) Whoever seriously threatens with the commission of the 
offense… and, thus, causes terror, shall be punished with 
imprisonment of at least two years. 
(4) With incarceration of up to ten years is punished whoever 
forms or accedes as a member to a structured group with a 
continuous activity, consisting of three or more persons acting 
jointly and with the purpose of committing [a terrorist 
offense]. … The manufacturing, procurement or possession of 
weapons, explosives and chemical or biological materials or 
materials emitting radiations harmful to man for the purpose 
of serving the objectives of the terrorist organization shall 
constitute an aggravating circumstance. …. 
(5) Whoever heads the terrorist organization…shall be 
punished with incarceration of at least ten years. …. 
(6) Whoever provides any kind of assets, tangible or 
intangible, moveable or immovable or any kind of financial 
instruments, regardless of their mode of acquisition, to a 
terrorist organization or an individual terrorist or for setting up 
a terrorist organization or for someone to become a terrorist or 
whoever receives, collects or manages any such assets or 
instruments with reference to the above, … shall be punished 
with incarceration of up to ten years.  With the same penalty is 
also punished whoever provides substantial information, with 
knowledge of such information being used in the future, to 
facilitate or support the commission by a terrorist organization 
or an individual terrorist.    
 
These changes help to enhance Greece’s legal tools against 
terrorism and reflect the seriousness with which it views its 
security threats.173  As one evaluates the evolution of Greece’s 
                                                
172 See United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 
Nov. 15, 2000, A/RES/55/25 (saying that the Palermo Protocol established an ad 
hoc committee for elaborating a convention against transnational crime while 
discussing the illicit trafficking of individuals and firearms); see also THE 
GOVERNMENT OF GREECE, supra note 171, at 11 (mentioning that the Palermo 
Protocol helps advance the legal framework for the protection of minors against 
illegal trafficking). 
173  See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, THIRD MUTUAL EVALUATION OF 
GREECE: TENTH FOLLOW-UP REPORT 1, 17 (Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/FoR%20Greece.pdf (noting that the 
Greek Parliament adopted the Palermo Convention in 2010, allowing for the 
government to arrest those who aid terrorists); see also U.N. Secretariat, 
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security legislation and policies of the last few decades—Laws 
774/79, 1916/90, 2928/01, 3251/2004, and 3875/2010—it is 
remarkable the amount of change that has occurred in the Greek 
security system.  Also remarkable is how these changes have been 
precipitated by a military dictatorship, E.U. membership, the 
Olympic Games, and now, the Greek economic crisis.    
 
VI. Greece’s Emerging Terrorist Threats 
 
Following the Olympics Greece dramatically scaled down 
its security infrastructure.  Most security personnel from the 
domestic security units, including experts from the N17 operation, 
were reassigned as both political attention and financial 
prioritization toward security waned.174  Yet, in just the few years 
following the Games, there were more than a dozen terrorist 
attacks on Greek soil, including the assassination of a British 
military attaché guard, bomb attacks at government offices, and 
more assassination attempts, including one which targeted 
Chrysochoidis’ successor Minister Giorgos Voulgarakis.175  British 
and American authorities objected that the security infrastructure 
they helped to create had been dismantled, and complained of 
Voulgarakis’ use of the police rather than the antiterrorism squad 
to conduct terror-related investigations.176  Rumors surfaced that 
Greece was reverting to its earlier ways.177  So, when an anti-tank 
                                                                                                         
Application of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime by State Parties With Respect to Criminal Offences Against Cultural 
Property, CTOC/COP/WG.2/20123-CTOC/COP/WG.3/2012/4 (July 31, 2012) 
(adding that Greece has integrated the Organized Crime Convention into its 
domestic law framework through the adoption of 3875/2010). 
174 See Interview with Dr. Athanassios Drougos, Senior Lecturer, Hellenic 
Defense Colleges (Oct. 17, 2010) (asserting that counterterrorism efforts have 
diminished); see also George Gilson, Greece’s Interests Attacked, ATHENS 
NEWS (Jan. 17, 2007), http://www.athensnews.gr/old_issue/13218/15646 
(explaining how police officers were transferred from the counterterrorism unit). 
175 See George Gilson, Greece’s New Terrorists Strike, ATHENS NEWS (June 2, 
2006),http://www.athensnews.gr/old_issue/13185/14640?action=print 
(describing g the bomb attacks on Minister Giorgos Voulgarakis). 
176 See Risen, supra note 7 (discussing how Americans believe Greece is weak 
in handling terrorism). 
177 See Matthew J. Peed, Blacklisting as Foreign Policy: The Politics and Law of 
Listing Terror States, 54 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1344 (2005) (noting that Greece has 
substandard counterterrorism efforts); see also Greece Toughens Law on 
Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/12/ 
world/europe/12greece.html (highlighting Greece’s terrorism history). 
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missile was fired into the American Embassy and exploded near 
the office of the U.S. Ambassador, Greece and the world took 
notice.178  Since then, the world has not stopped watching the 
terrorist resurgence in Greece.179  
It is widely understood by security experts that the left-
wing terrorism popularized by N17 has regenerated into a new 
form of domestic terrorism.  Greek security experts believe groups 
such as Revolutionary Struggle (EA), Sect of Revolutionaries (SE), 
and Conspiracy of Fire Nuclei (SPF) are behind many of the new 
attacks.180  EA is confirmed to have had affiliations with N17 
members and British officials believe EA began as a loosely 
associated splinter group initially stylized as the “next generation” 
of N17. 181   British authorities believe the largest threats 
confronting Greece are from EA and SE, but both organizations 
appear less coherent and more anarchist than revolutionary.182 In 
                                                
178 See Explosion Hits U.S. Embassy in Athens, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/12/world/europe/12greece.html (detailing a 
powerful explosion at the U.S. Embassy in Greece, reportedly caused by a 
rocket). 
179  See Kolaitis, supra note 92, at 38 (discussing a new wave of Greek 
terrorism); see also Ian Fisher & Anthee Carassava, Explosion Attack on U.S. 
Embassy Revives Greek Fear of Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2007), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/14/world/europe/14greece.html 
?_r=0 (describing a new wave of terrorism).  
180 See Ian Fisher & Anthee Carassava, U.S. Embassy in Athens is Attacked, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2007), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/12/ 
world/europe/12cnd-greece.html?_r=0 (identifying the Revolutionary Struggle 
as the active terror group responsible for the U.S. Embassy bombing); see also 
NAT’L COUNTERTERROISM CENTER, supra note 8 (detailing various domestic 
terrorist that work with Greece’s borders). 
181 See Interview with British Embassy counterterrorism official (notes on file 
with author); see also November 17, Revolutionary People's Struggle, 
Revolutionary Struggle (Greece, Leftists), COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 12, 
2012), http://www.cfr.org/greece/november-17-revolutionary-peoples-struggle-
revolutionary-struggle-greece-leftists/p9275# (claiming that the Revolutionary 
Struggle was created by remaining members of N17 who were not detained by 
Greece’s counterterrorism unit).	   
182 See Interview with British Embassy counterterrorism official, supra note 182; 
see also ISG IntelBrief: The Shifting Terrorist Threat to the Global Financial 
Sector, THE SOUFAN GROUP (July 26, 2012), http://soufangroup.com/briefs/ 
details/?Article_Id=349 (listing the Revolutionary Struggle, Sect of 
Revolutionaries, Conspiracy of Fire Nuclei, and International Revolutionary 
Front as the greatest current left-wing terrorist threats in Greece). 
                              ST. JOHN’S JOURNAL OF                  [Vol. 3, No. 2 
                    INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 
 
204 
this regard they could be more dangerous.183  The flux of these 
organizations could create competing interests and increase their 
susceptibility to dangerous ad hoc alliances.184  Further, there is a 
risk these organizations may seek stronger identification from one 
another and attempt even more sensational attacks.185   
What is striking about the reemergence of Greece’s 
domestic terrorists are the three new elements now a part of the 
security calculus: (i) the economic crisis; (ii) changing 
demographics; and (iii) the evolving nature of terrorism. 
   Greece’s economic crisis forecasts a bleak future for those 
already referred to as the “lost generation.”  This generation came 
of age during the optimism of Greece’s European prosperity, but it 
is now regarded as a casualty of the Eurozone debt crisis, which 
has shattered the country’s prospects and psyche.186  Under such 
traumatic conditions it should come as no surprise that political 
violence in the streets has become a common occurrence.  Nor 
should the leap from political violence to resurgent terrorist 
activity be unexpected, especially given the revolutionary strains in 
Greece’s political culture. 
More recently, Greece has become home to many Muslim 
immigrants, especially Albanians, Pakistanis and Palestinians, 
many of whom are undocumented and disenfranchised in the 
                                                
183 See Interview with British Embassy counterterrorism official, supra note 182; 
see also Kolaitis, supra note 92, at 39 (describing the new generation of 
anarchist and terrorist groups as more aggressive, indiscriminate, and advanced 
in its methods and tactics). 
184 See Interview with British Embassy counterterrorism official, supra note 182; 
see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2009 (Aug. 5, 
2010) http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2009/140885.htm (reporting that the 
Guerilla Group of Terrorists and the Conspiracy of Fire Nuclei jointly bombed 
the National Insurance Company building in Athens).  
185 See Interview with British Embassy counterterrorism official, supra note 182; 
see also Kolaitis, supra note 92, at 39 (predicting that the recent increase in 
terrorist incidences in Greece will only get worse). 
186 See Elena Becatoros, Greece Racist Attacks Increase Amid Financial Crisis, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 11, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11 
/12/greece-racist-attacks_n_2116302.html (stating that amid Greece’s financial 
crisis, half of its youth is currently unemployed and therefore cannot afford 
basic necessities and healthcare); see also Nicholas Paphitis, 2 Greeks Charged 
in Pakistani Immigrant’s Killing, WSLS 10 (January 18, 2013), 
http://www2.wsls.com/news/2013/jan/18/2-greeks-charged-in-pakistani-
immigrants-killing-ar-2476201/ (noting that in the past three years Greece has 
been struggling with a financial crisis that has debilitated living standards and 
employment). 
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relatively homogenous, proudly Christian, and often nationalistic 
Hellenic Republic.187  It would be an understatement to say that 
Greece has been slow to assimilate and accommodate its growing 
Muslim population, including its cultural and institutional 
resistance to the establishment of mosques, which is forcing many 
Muslims into underground prayer and religious education. 188  
Security experts fear that marginalizing Greece’s Muslims could 
lead to a radicalization of segments of the population.  It does not 
help that amid the frustration of the economic crisis many Greeks 
are expressing resentment toward their immigrant populations, 
declaring even that “Greece is for Greeks.” Accordingly, security 
experts suspect that with mounting resentment, growing 
underground communities, and both domestic and foreign radical 
elements seeking exploitation, these ingredients could turn into a 
dangerous recipe.189 
   Lastly, the evolving nature of terrorism is also a 
disproportionate threat.  The risks posed by the few require 
comprehensive and costly countermeasures by the many.  Often 
                                                
187  See LORING M. DANFORTH, THE MACEDONIAN CONFLICT: ETHNIC 
NATIONALISM IN A TRANSNATIONAL WORLD 112 (1997) (stating that because 
Greek is so homogeneous both nationally and religiously, any minority group 
that is believed to threaten that is often discriminated against); see also Eric 
Randolph, Greece Struggles With its Minority Immigrants, THE NATIONAL (June 
25, 2012), http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/europe/greece-struggles-with-
its-minority-immigrants#ixzz2IfGtgl5h (finding that there are roughly half a 
million illegal immigrants in Greece today who have fled from Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, and Iran). 
188 See Elizabeth F. Defeis, Religious Liberty and Protections in Europe, 45 J. 
CATH. LEGAL STUD. 73, 83 (2006) (recognizing that Greece, with an established 
Church, has been criticized for its restrictions on religious liberty and its 
regulation of places of worship); see also Matthew Brunwasser, Greece Turns 
Back on Religious Minorities, PRI’S THE WORLD (Aug. 7, 2012), 
http://www.theworld.org/2012/08/greece-religion-muslims/ (noting that the 
Greek government has never allowed an official mosque to be built in Athens 
since the country achieved independence in 1821). 
189 See Rachel Donadio, Dread and Uncertainty Pervade Life in a Diminished 
Greece, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/14/world/ 
Europe/greeks-dread-future-as-their-world deteriorates.html?pagewanted=all 
&_r=0 (finding that Greeks are depressed about their families and Greece’s 
immense economic troubles); see also J. Michael Kennedy, For Illegal 
Immigrants, Greek Border Offers a Back Door to Europe, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/world/europe/illegal-immigrants-
slip-into-europe-by-way-of-greek-border.html (reasoning that as a result of 
Greece’s heavy debt and growing number of immigrants, people are 
increasingly taking out their frustrations on immigrants). 
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the use of terror, which tends to be tactical rather than strategic, 
generates leverage for practical purposes often political in 
nature. 190   More common, though, is the blurring distinction 
between terrorism and criminal enterprise.191  A synergy regularly 
exists between the two, with their interests, objectives, and profits 
intertwining into an exponential threat. 192   Security and 
intelligence organizations historically failed to separate terrorism 
from organized crime or domestic from international.193  It is 
widely known now that terrorists exploit such administrative seams 
and boldly operate across one category to the next.194  Terrorist 
motivations range from the religious to the political to the 
                                                
190 See Wadie E. Said, Humanitarian Law Project and the Supreme Court's 
Construction of Terrorism, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1455, 1472 (2011) (finding that 
terrorism is politically motivated violence that is geared toward making changes 
in government or policy); see also Nathaniel Stewart, Ohio's Statutory and 
Common Law History with "Terrorism": A Study in Domestic Terrorism Law, 
32 J. LEGIS. 93, 105 (2005) (discussing that terrorism is a crime of terror that is 
meant to bring about political change). 
191 See Mariona Llobet, Chapter 5 Terrorism: Limits Between Crime and War.  
The Fallacy of the Slogan ‘War on Terror’, 14 IUS GENTIUM 101, 112 (2012) 
(claiming that terrorism must be subject to criminal law because it is a form of 
crime); see also Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions of 
Terrorism: The Problem of Too Many Grails, 30 J. LEGIS. 249, 252 (2004) 
(finding that the acts of ordinary criminals have been labeled as terrorism). 
192 See TORE BJØRGO, ROOT CAUSES OF TERRORISM: MYTHS, REALITY AND 
WAYS FORWARD 19–20 (Routledge, 2005) (remarking that the infusion of 
money made from crime often changes the character and motivations of terrorist 
organizations); see also FLORINA CRISTIANA MATEI, RESEARCH INST. FOR EUR. 
AND AM. STUD., COMBATING TERRORISM AND ORGANIZED CRIME: SOUTH 
EASTERN EUROPE COLLECTIVE APPROACHES 6 (2009) (recognizing South 
Eastern Europe has been a fertile ground for organized crime and terrorism 
which has allowed the two to merge and pursue common goals). 
193 See FLORINA CRISTIANA MATEI, RESEARCH INST. FOR EUR. AND AM. STUD., 
COMBATING TERRORISM AND ORGANIZED CRIME: SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE 
COLLECTIVE APPROACHES 6–7 (2009) (asserting, globalization has contributed 
to a convergence between organized crime and terrorist activities); see also 
JOHN ROLLINS & LIANA SUN WYLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TERRORISM AND 
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME: FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 2–4 (2012) 
(noting that the U.S. government has recognized an increased connection 
between crime and terrorism). 
194 See BJØRGO, supra note 192, at 164 (explaining that because of the high 
earnings from acts typically associated with organized crime, terrorist groups 
have begun to adopt illicit trafficking to fund their actions); see also Thomas M. 
Sanderson, Transnational Terror and Organized Crime: Blurring the Lines, 24 
SCH. FOR ADVANCED INT’L STUD. 49, 49–50 (2004) (stressing the increased 
threat as organized crime and terrorist groups are converging with one another). 
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revolutionary, but when paired with criminal enterprise, the profit 
element makes this kind of terrorism an especially lethal mix.195  
For instance, take how the anti-globalization group Revolutionary 
Struggle uses Chinese made rockets,196 or how elements in Sunni 
affiliated al Qaeda fundraise through the poppy trade and traffic 
materials to competing Shia.197  The profit motive risks turning 
terrorism and organized crime into a dynamic and sustainable 
enterprise.  To combat this kind of advanced partnership requires 
comprehensive and concentrated security measures.  Yet Greece, 
in its current economic state, cannot adequately confront these 
three new elements within its security agenda.   
CONCLUSION 
 
Given its weak economic condition, it is unlikely the 
terrorist resurgence in Greece will subside.  As a result, the E.U. is 
left little choice but to assist Greece in reinvesting in its security 
infrastructure. Between dismantling N17 and hosting the 
Olympics, Greece constructed a renowned security apparatus, 
albeit now a neglected security framework. Its capabilities have 
diminished due to resource and political reprioritization.  Yet, as 
                                                
195  See ROLLINS & WYLER, supra note 193, at 5 (acknowledging that 
collaborations between terrorist and criminal organizations increases terrorists’ 
capabilities, strengthens their infrastructure, and increases their wealth); see also 
Thomas M. Sanderson, Transnational Terror and Organized Crime: Blurring 
the Lines, 24 SCH. FOR ADVANCED INT’L STUD. 49, 58–59 (2004) (arguing that 
the combination of crime and terrorism is an increasingly powerful challenge to 
U.S. and global interests). 
196 See Fisher & Carassava, supra note 180 (stating that an antitank grenade was 
fired upon the U.S. embassy in Athens by the anti-American group 
Revolutionary Struggle); see also Josh White, Missile Hits U.S. Embassy in 
Greece, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/01/12/ AR2007011200051.html (recognizing that the 
group Revolutionary Struggle fired a rocket-propelled missile which hit the U.S. 
Embassy in Athens). 
197 See Maria Abi-Habib, Gains by Taliban Open Door to Opium Revival, WALL 
ST. J. (Jan. 19, 2011),http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB10001424052748704678 
004576089360303878944.html (reporting that the Taliban reaps about $125 
million a year from the sale of opium); see also Luke Mogelson, The Scariest 
Little Corner of the World, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com 
/2012/10/21/magazine/the-corner-where-afghanistan-iran-and-pakistameet.html 
?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (noting opium and other drugs are accounting for a 
progressively larger proportion of  al Qaeda’s revenue).  
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the ongoing terrorist attacks demonstrate, Greece is facing a 
resurgence in domestic threats and increased potential for new 
foreign threats.  These threats can only be addressed through 
dramatic financial and political investments.  In particular, more 
resources should be directed toward the antiterrorism units to 
increase their capabilities to prevent and investigate terrorism-
related crimes.  Greece should also enhance cooperation between 
its organized crime, immigration, and antiterrorism divisions, as 
some of the new emerging threats will invariably involve all three 
services.  
Greece should also commit to substantive Islamic outreach.  
Greece’s sizeable and disenfranchised Muslim population is being 
marginalized in the Greek state.  The implications of this 
continuing alienation may risk the radicalization of segments of its 
Muslim communities.  Greece should implement policy measures 
to build relationships with community leaders and, in particular, 
help pave the way for the establishment of mosques and 
community centers.  The existence of these symbolic institutions 
will reduce the need for at-home prayer and informal religious 
education.  Eventually, a healthy Muslim society can enfranchise 
itself, but only if Greece’s institutional and cultural barriers begin 
to break down.  To do otherwise, Greece’s Muslim population 
could become a destabilizing element within the country, possibly 
adding another dangerous dimension to Greece’s already 
vulnerable security condition.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
